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WHITE LIBERAL LOOKS AT RACIST
SPEECH
PETER LINZER*
I am sitting in my favorite reading place, reading Mar Mat-
suda's article, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story.1 I have finally overcome my vanity and have
bought a seven dollar pair of reading glasses so that I can read
the footnotes without squinting, and though my stereo is broken,
I am able to listen to a new compact disc of the Mozart Clarinet
Concerto on my Walkman. I am in hog's heaven.
Then the phone rings and I hobble off to answer it. I almost
miss the call; I can't see the phone because of the reading
glasses and I can't hear what's being said because of the ear-
phones. I've always had perfect health, but for a second I get a
glimpse of what it must be like to be dependent on (and limited
by) physical aids and prosthetic devices. A minute later I read
in Matsuda: "Legal insiders cannot imagine a life disabled in a
significant way by hate propaganda.'
I am what in Texas is called a "Yellow Dog Democrat": I'd
sooner vote for an old yellow dog than for a Republican. Not only
am I a card-carrying member of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), but I'm also on the chapter and state affiliate
boards, and I wrote the National ACLU's amicus brief to the
United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson,3 the first flag-
burning case. I am about as close to being an absolutist about the
first amendment as a rational lawyer can be, but the problem of
racist speech has me troubled. And Matsuda's article and others by
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B. 1960, Cornell University;
J.D. 1963, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to friends and colleagues of
widely different outlooks who generously read and criticized the manuscript of this essay or
discussed the topic with me at length. They include David Crump, Sashe Dimitroff, David
Dow, Marc Franklin, David Gregory, Steven Huber, Bill Kaplin, Mari Matsuda, Micheal
Olivas, Laura Oren, Irene Rosenberg, Rhea Stevens and Patricia Tidwell. m. elisabeth ber-
geron, Executive Articles Editor of the St. John's Law Review, was invaluable.
I Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. Rpy. 2320 (1989).
2 Id. at 2375.
3 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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articulate writers of "outsider jurisprudence" almost have me con-
vinced. Almost.
I. THE PROBLEM
Until recently I was convinced that America had a serious race
problem, but that the problem was primarily economic, and no
longer the result of raw prejudice. This was not to say that there
was no prejudice left, but that it was relatively discrete; lower-in-
come whites and old, rural southerners were still fond of words like
"nigger" and "wetback," and there were still places where the civil
rights acts were not enforced, but the bulk of the population was
at least fairly tolerant of the notion that a person deserves a fair
shake regardless of color.4
But I have seen enough evidence now to reject my conclusions
about the eradication of traditional prejudice. An excellent student
Note recently published gave examples of the happenings in con-
temporary university settings:
The reports of racist incidents on college campuses recur continu-
ally in the popular press. The National Institute Against
Prejudice and Violence collected reports of seventy-eight inci-
dents of racial violence or allegations of prejudice that occurred in
the spring semester of 1988 alone, and that did not purport to be
a comprehensive survey. The recurrence of old-fashioned inten-
tional racism on campuses is the most obvious form of hostility,
and a sampling demonstrates the ferocity of some such incidents,
which have variously involved: graffiti containing swastikas and
antiblack epithets; cross-burning; the protesting of an all-white
fraternity's "White History Week" party; the shouting of racial
slurs; the distribution of openly hostile leaflets; racial brawls; and
black student class boycotts and protests. The comprehensive list
of such incidents is much longer, and that list does not include
unreported incidents, which may well be the majority.5
' Affirmative action was another matter. Many (perhaps most) whites oppose affirma-
tive action, and while I disagree, I am unwilling to call their opposition racist. How to break
the connection between poverty and race is a serious problem, but to my mind disagreement
about means is not prejudice pure and simple. One of the points of this essay is that
"prejudice pure and simple" is itself simplistic. For a thoughtful analysis along these lines,
see Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 682-86 (1985).
' Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295, 315-16-(1990)
[hereinafter Virginia Note] (citations omitted). Like Pettigrew, supra note 4, the .Virginia
Note goes beyond traditional racism in its discussion. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F.
Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (describing lack of attention given to racial incidents that
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Furthermore, many violent incidents occurring outside the col-
lege setting have made headlines: for example, Vincent Chin's
death by baseball bat in Detroit6 and the Howard Beach and Ben-
sonhurst killings in New York City.7 The problem is real. The evi-
dence has been put forth by many writers, citing both systematic
studies and journalistic accounts.'
II. THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED
A number of proposals have been put forth to deal with "hate
speech" through some form of legal sanction. They range from
criminal statutes to tort remedies to a variety of university regula-
tions. Even the ACLU has gotten into the act. The criminal stat-
utes may make an existing crime, such as assault and battery, more
serious if motivated by racial harassment,9 or make the uttering of
offensive words a crime in itself, either as a form of harassment"
prompted university to adopt its policy on discrimination). For other examples of the recur-
rence of traditional racism, in several settings, see Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 135
n.12 (1982) (citing various authorities who describe recent incidents of verbal racism); Mat-
suda, supra note 1, at 2320-21, 2326-38, 2370-73 (specific instances and effects of racism,
especially on college campuses); Soltis, Sensitivity Training 101, 76 A.B.A. J. 47, 47 (July
1990) (discussing specific instances of racial harassment on college campuses); Williams, The
Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128,
2132-37 (1989) (describing "Ujamaa House incidents" at Stanford).
6 See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2330 n.55.
See Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as
the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. iAmi L. REv. 127, 136 (1987).
8 See France, Hate Goes to College, 76 A.B.A. J. 44 passim (July 1990). For a percep-
tive view by an American-born Israeli, see Chafets, The Tragedy of Detroit, N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1990, § 6 (Magazine) at 22, reprinted in Z. CHAFETS, Devil's Night and Other True
Tales of Detroit (1990).
9 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1(a), (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) ("[a]
person commits ethnic intimidation when, by reason of ... race, . . . he commits assault.
• . .[A]ny person who commits ethnic intimidation as a participant in a mob action...
which results in the violent infliction of injury... shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony"); MAss.
GN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 1990) ("Whoever commits an assault or a battery upon
a person ... for the purpose of intimidation because of ... [the] person's race .... shall be
punished by a fine ... or by imprisonment... or both"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4)(a)
(West 1991) ("Whoever assaults another because of the victim's or another's actual or per-
ceived race ... may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to pay-
ment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both").
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (2) (Consol. Supp. 1990) ("No person shall,
because of race ... be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights, or to any harass-
ment ... in the exercise thereof, by any other persons ... or by the state. . . ."); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1)(a)-(b), (3) (1990) ("A person is guilty of malicious harassment if
he maliciously and with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of...
that person's race ... [c]auses physical injury to another person; or [b]y words or conduct
1991]
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or as criminal group libel."' Tort remedies have been suggested for
many years, dating back to the seminal writing of sociologist and
lawyer David Riesman during World War II.12 Most significantly,
universities all over the country have been debating and adopting
conduct codes forbidding racist and other forms of "hate speech"
according to various formulas.
A. The Writers
Modern scholarship on the subject usually dates from Richard
Delgado's Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling.'s Professor Delgado showed at some
length that racial insults cause injuries of the type traditionally
compensated by tort law. 4 He reviewed ways in which traditional
torts such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress and statutory torts involving discrimination have been
used in racial insult situations. 5 He concluded, however, that none
of the existing remedies work well and proposed the establishment
of an "action for racial insult." Under the proposal, a plaintiff
could recover by proving that
[1] anguage was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was
intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff
understood as intended to demean through reference to race; and
that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult.'6
Professor Delgado's proposal was quite modest and relatively lim-
ited. Whether racially demeaning language would be actionable
would depend on the context of its utterence.
[A]n epithet such as "You damn nigger" would almost always be
places another person in reasonable fear of harm to his person .... Such words or conduct
include ... words [that] historically or traditionally connotate hatred or threats toward the
victim, or written or oral communications designed to intimidate or harass because of...
that person's race .... Malicious harassment is a class C felony").
" See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 272, § 98C (West 1990) (prohibiting publication
of "any false written or printed material with intent to maliciously promote hatred of any
group of persons ... because of race"); Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel
Laws, 101 HARv. L. Rav. 682, 695-96 (1988) (group libel laws satisfy demands of first
amendment).
" See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L.
REv. 727, 775-80 (1942).
'8 See Delgado, supra note 5.
14 Id. at 135-49.
18 Id. at 150-65.
16 Id. at 179.
[Vol. 65:187
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found actionable, as it is highly insulting and highly racial. How-
ever, an insult such as "You incompetent fool," directed at a
black person by a white, even in a context which made it highly
insulting, would not be actionable because it lacks a racial compo-
nent. "Boy," directed at a young black male, might be actionable,
depending on the speaker's intent, the hearer's understanding,
and whether a reasonable person would consider it a racial insult
in the particular context. "Hey, nigger," spoken affectionately be-
tween black persons and used as a greeting, would not be actiona-
ble. An insult such as "You dumb honkey," directed at a white
person, could be actionable under this formulation of the cause of
action, but only in the unusual situations where the plaintiff
would suffer harm from such an insult.17
Mari Matsuda, in what has become the leading article on the
topic, proposed that we consider "racist hate messages" as unpro-
tected by the first amendment if three characteristics are present:
"1. The message is of racial inferiority; 2. [t]he message is directed
against a historically oppressed group; and 3. [t]he message is per-
secutorial, hateful, and degrading."'
Professor Matsuda gave very little detail on the specific reme-
dies that she would make available to victims of an unprotected
racist hate message. She said only that "a range of legal interven-
tions, including the use of tort law and criminal law principles, is
appropriate to combat racist hate propaganda."'19 She elaborated
in a footnote:
17 Id. at 179-80 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote accompanying the last sentence of the
quoted passage, Delgado stated that the cause of action was designed primarily to protect
members of racial minority groups traditionally victimized, but that there were some cir-
cumstances where a racial insult might cause harm when directed to members of the major-
ity. Id. at 180 n.275. He gave the example of a white child being called a "dumb honkey" by
a black teacher in a predominately black school. Id. In this respect, Delgado offered some-
what more protection to whites than does Mari Matsuda, who requires that the message be
"directed against a historically oppressed group." Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357. Professor
Matsuda agreed that some whites would fit within the concept of a "historically oppressed
group," but focused more on group status than on the vulnerability of the person insulted in
the particular incident. Id. at 2361-63. Although both Professors Delgado and Matsuda ar-
gned that members of the majority have greater support and "safe havens" from racial in-
sults, and thus need less protection, they recognize that some majority members are none-
theless vulnerable and should be protected. Id. at 2358; Delgado, supra note 5, at 180; see
also Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 Miss. COLL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988)
("[iut is, at least, hardly self-evident that anti-black and anti-white speech must rationally
be regarded as symmetrical harms in nature and degree").
" Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357.
19 Id. at 2360 (footnote omitted).
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In addition to judicial modification of first amendment analysis,
the forms of remedy could include creation of a new crime of ra-
cist speech, enhanced sentencing for existing crimes where racial
motivation is found, administrative mechanisms for fines and in-
junctive relief, civil actions for damages, or a combination of the
above.2 0
Matsuda devoted her article to a description of the impact of
racist speech on the victims, an analysis of first amendment law
and an argument that by taking the victim's perspective into ac-
count and narrowly defining prohibited speech with the three cri-
teria set out above,21 one could, consistent with the values of free-
dom of speech, read the first amendment to exclude racist speech
from its protection.22 She also considered several "gray area" case
scenarios, and indicated where she thought line-drawing appropri-
ate.2" For example, rather than stretching present exceptions to the
first amendment like "fighting words" or obscenity, and rather
than trying to conceal anti-racist laws in a neutral mask, "[i]t is
more honest, and less cynically manipulative of legal doctrine, to
legislate openly against the worst forms of racist speech, allowing
ourselves to know what we know. '24
In the past few months there has been a flood of writing on
25 othe issue. One of the most notable and eagerly awaited articles
'0 Id. at 2360 n.207.
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2356-61.
23 Id. at 2361-73.
24 Id. at 2374.
21 See, e.g., Bartlett and O'Barr, The Chilly Climate on College Campuses: An Expan-
sion of the "Hate Speech" Debate, 1990 DuKE L.J. 574; Dubick, Freedom To Hate: Do the
Criminal Code Proscriptions Against Hate Propaganda Infringe the Charter?, 54 SAS-
KATCHE WAN L. REV. 149 (1990); Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech
and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 119 (1991); Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory
Harassment By Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing of First-Amendment and Univer-
sity Interests, 16 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 573 (1990); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Love, Discriminatory Speech
and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123
(1990); Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & M. L. REV.
291 (1990); Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990); Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech On Cam-
pus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484; Note, Closing the Campus Gates to Free
Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech At Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY
L.J. 1351 (1990) [hereinafter Emory Note]; Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII
Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 64 S. CALiF. L. REV. 105 (1990). Still others are
listed in Post, supra, at 291 n.5.
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was Charles Lawrence's If He Hollers Let Him Go,26 an expansion
of Professor Lawrence's debate with Nadine Strossen at the Bien-
nial Conference of the ACLU. Lawrence argued that Brown v.
Board of Education28 was itself a regulation of racist speech:
Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primar-
ily because of the message segregation conveys-the message that
black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with
white children. Segregation serves its purpose by conveying an
idea.. . . Therefore, Brown may be read as regulating the content
of racist speech. 29
Lawrence also argued that distinctions between speech and con-
duct are inapposite ("[r]acism is both 100% speech and 100% con-
duct"),30 and that the distinction between public and private con-
duct is overdrawn in the area of racism:
When a person responds to the argument that Brown man-
dates the abolition of racist speech by reciting the state action
doctrine, she fails to consider that the alternative to regulating
racist speech is infringement of the claims of blacks to liberty and
equal protection. The best way to constitutionally protect these
competing interests is to balance them directly. To invoke the
state action doctrine- is to circumvent our value judgment as to
how these competing interests should be balanced. 1
In this Symposium, Mary Ellen Gale, a noted civil libertarian,
has challenged what she calls "the heroic ideal of the first amend-
ment. ' 32 Professor Gale concludes:
We can expand our vision of the first amendment beyond the lib-
ertarian paradigm-to acknowledge a more complicated world.
We can regulate speech to combat the harms done when speakers
themselves perpetuate prejudice and repression: silencing the
voices of targeted victims, undermining equality, and decreasing
both individual liberty and democratic dialogue. A more complex
theory of free speech, informed by social context and lived experi-
ence, can take the harms of racist speech seriously and allow us to
16 1990 Duwr L.J. 431.
27 See infra notes 66 and 90-91, and accompanying text.
28 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29 Lawrence, supra note 25, at 439-40.
30 Id. at 444.
31 Id. at 446-47 (footnotes omitted). Professor Lawrence's article is up to his usual high
standard, but I think he is well answered by Nadine Strossen in an article printed together
with his in the Duke Law Journal. See Strossen, supra note 25, at 541-49.
2 Gale, supra note 25, at 136-41.
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weave a remedy into our continuing constitutional story of indi-
vidual rights.33
B. The Universities
The issue's major battleground has become the universities.
Some of the reasons are clear. As the number of non-white stu-
dents has increased, particularly ugly forms of racism have become
endemic on campuses that had prided themselves on their sophis-
tication and tolerance of difference. 4 Universities traditionally
adopt regulations concerning student conduct, and their adminis-
trations are at least somewhat more susceptible to pressure from
minorities than the government in general.
I have been told that more than one hundred universities have
adopted some degree of regulation of racist speech. I will limit my-
self to the regulations of three state universities, Michigan, Texas,
Wisconsin, 5 and one private university, Stanford, each of which
take a somewhat different approach.
A federal district court struck down as unconstitutional the
University of Michigan's Policy on Discrimination and Discrimina-
tory Harassment of Students in the University Environment (the
"Policy"),3 8 and the university has since replaced it. As this deci-
11 Id. at 184. Given time and space constraints, I cannot discuss Professor Gale's article
in any depth. I do not think that she and I are really that far apart, just as I do not think
that she and Nadine Strossen are that far apart. In fact, I find Gale's conclusions about
what she would restrict much milder than her rhetoric. Similarly, I frequently noticed that
after making fairly outrageous (and in my lights irritating) remarks in text, Gale felt obliged
to modify them in her supporting footnotes. For instance, though she states in text that:
"[h]eterosexual white males ... often exalt the heroic ideal of the first amendment while
seldom, if ever, suffering its consequences," she immediately follows this with a footnote
conceding that "I realize that the statement in the text is easy to undermine," and appends
a list of eleven people who are either heterosexual white males who do not exalt "the heroic
ideal" or are white women or people of color who do. Id. at 138 n.58 and accompanying text.
I conclude that Professor Gale would like to be more radical than her considerable legal and
academic ability allows her to be.
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" Each of the three state universities is actually a system with several campuses. The
Michigan and Texas regulations applied only to their main campuses, at Ann Arbor and
Austin respectively. The Wisconsin regulations seem to apply to the entire university
system.
" See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see
also Emory Note, supra note 25, at 1357-78 (extensive discussion of both University of
Michigan policy and Doe decision); Comment, First Amendment-Racist and Sexist Ex-
pression on Campus-Court Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech-Doe v. Uni-
versity of Michigan, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1397 (1990) (further analysis of the court's opinion);
infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (in-depth discussion of Doe court's analysis).
RACIST SPEECH
sion is the only judicial opinion on this topic thus far, it warrants a
detailed examination. The 'Policy subjected to university discipline
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes
an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's aca-
demic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering
with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation
in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal
safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for
educational pursuits, employment or participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities.3 7
Section 1(c) was withdrawn less than three months after the Policy
took effect (but after the federal lawsuit had been filed), on the
ground that "a need exists for further explanation and clarifica-
tion" of the provision.38
Together with the Policy, the university issued an official "In-
terpretive Guide" ("Guide") that contained a number of poorly
thought out illustrations of what constituted violations of the Pol-
icy. The Guide was a major reason that the court invalidated the
Policy, primarily because, together with the university's actual en-
forcement, it revealed the Policy's overbreadth and demonstrated
its potential for misapplication by well-meaning but overzealous
administrators.3"
Some parts of the Policy, dealing with physical behavior and
express threats, are not particularly controversial and do not re-
quire examination here. For our purposes, we may concentrate on
the fact that the Michigan approach focused on "verbal behav-
17 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856.
38 Id. at 856. The Policy had a second section dealing with "[s]exual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual
on the basis of sex or sexual orientation," which had provisions paralleling sections 1(a)-(c).
Id. Section 2(c) was not withdrawn. Id.
13 See id. at 861-67. The Interpretive Guide helped give the plaintiff standing, as dis-
cussed infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. On the standing question, the court
stated, "[I]f the plain language of the policy were all the Court had before it, it would prob-
ably conclude that Doe had failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the Policy
would be construed to cover his anticipated speech.... The slate was not so clean, how-
ever." Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 859.
1991]
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ior"40 that "stigmatizes or victimizes" an individual on the basis of
any of a rather long list of factors.41 In addition, the complainant
had to show either a threat, express or implied, or an intention or
reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with the individual's ac-
ademic efforts, employment, extracurricular participation or per-
sonal safety. While the "stigmatizes or victimizes" language is
vague, the additional requirement did have a narrowing effect. Sec-
tion 1(c), had it not been withdrawn, would have been very troub-
lesome, since what "[c]reates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning
environment" is more difficult to define than threats and purposes.
Even without section 1(c), a complainant had a case, on the text of
the Policy, if she could prove that the speech "victimized or stig-
matized" her on one of the forbidden grounds, and had the reason-
ably foreseeable effect of interfering with the complainant's aca-
demic efforts.
The University of Wisconsin's rules permit discipline of a
student
[f]or racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expres-
sive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at
different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments,
epithets, other expressive behavior or physical conduct
intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sex-
ual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual
or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment
for education, university related work, or other university-author-
ized activity. 42
Intent is to "be determined by consideration of all relevant circum-
stances. '4' The Wisconsin Administrative Code contains, along
with its rules, three illustrations of violative conduct.
In order to illustrate the types of conduct which this subsection is
designed to cover, the following examples are set forth. These ex-
amples are not meant to illustrate the only situations or types of
conduct intended to be covered.
1. A student would be in violation if:
This kind of double-talk is just a rhetorical way to avoid the word "speech."
41 Some bf these factors approach the trivial ("[y]ou old, married, Vietnam-era Vet"
would seem to violate the Policy three times).
42 Wis. ADIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2)(a) (1989).
4 Id. § UWS 17.06(2)(b).
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a. He or she intentionally made demeaning remarks to an in-
dividual based on that person's ethnicity, such as name calling,
racial slurs, or "jokes"; and
b. His or her purpose in uttering the remarks was to make
the educational environment hostile for the person to whom the
demeaning remark was addressed.
2. A student would be in violation if:
a. He or she intentionally placed visual or written material
demeaning the race or sex of an individual in that person's uni-
versity living quarters or work area; and
b. His or her purpose was to make the educational environ-
ment hostile for the person in whose quarters or work area the
material was placed. 44
A fourth and last illustration gives an example of what is not
considered a violation:
A student would not be in violation if, during a class discussion,
he or she expressed a derogatory opinion concerning a racial or
ethnic group. There is no violation, since the student's remark
was addressed to the class as a whole, not to a specific individual.
Moreover, on the facts as stated, there seems no evidence that the
student's purpose was to create a hostile environment. 5
The University of Texas proposal4" rejects the stigmatization
or victimization approach of the University of Michigan which had
been declared unconstitutional before the Texas report appeared.4 7
Instead, it takes a double approach. Somewhat like the Wisconsin
rules, it provides that physical misconduct can be treated as an
aggregated offense for university disciplinary purposes if it has a
discriminatory purpose. 48 This is not terribly controversial.49 With
44 Id. § UWS 17.06(2)(c)(1)-(2). A third illustration makes the destruction of property
with a discriminatory motive a violation. Id. § UWS 17.06(2)(c)(3).
45 Id. § UWS 17.06(2)(c)(4). Compare id. with infra notes 111-12 and accompanying
text (addressing University of Michigan's Interpretive Guide which described similar con-
duct as sanctionable). On the Wisconsin rules, see generally Hodulik, supra note 25 (discus-
sion by University's senior system legal counsel).
" See REPORT OF PRESIDENT's AD Hoc CommrrrEE ON RACIAL HARASSMENT (Nov. 27,
1989) [hereinafter TEXAs REPORT]. The Committee was comprised of three students, three
faculty members, and three administration members, and was chaired by Mark G. Yudof,
Dean of the University of Texas Law School, and a prominent civil libertarian.
47 Id. at 16-17.
48 Id. at 7-8, 10-11.
4' This approach is used in the federal civil rights acts and in many local criminal stat-
utes that already make the underlying act a crime regardless of motivation. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170.75 (Deering 1990) (racial motivation is factor in felony sentencing).
1991]
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respect to speech alone, the Texas plan focuses on the intentional
infliction of emotional harm. It prohibits "racial harassment," and,
building on section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,50 it
defines "racial harassment" as "extreme or outrageous acts or com-
munications that are intended to harass, intimidate, or humiliate a
student or students on account of race, color, or national origin
and that reasonably cause them to suffer severe emotional dis-
tress."51 The commentary on the proposal conceded that its formu-
lation substitutes "acts or communications" where the Restate-
ment uses "conduct," but insisted that this was "in the nature of a
clarification and not a substantive revision."52 Violation could lead
to punishment ranging from an admonition to expulsion.53
Stanford University is a private institution that, under current
views of state action, is not subject to the first amendment. None-
theless, the proposal to add a racist speech "Interpretation" to
Stanford's "Fundamental Standard" led to a constitutional debate
involving the cream of Stanford Law School's faculty. 4 Stanford's
Fundamental Standard, written in 1896, states: "Students at Stan-
ford are expected to show both within and without the University
such respect for order, morality, personal honor and the rights of
others as is demanded of good citizens. Failure to do this will be
sufficient cause for removal from the University." 5
The "Interpretation," created by Stanford's Student Conduct
Legislative Council, begins with a strong statement of commitment
to the principles of free inquiry and free expression, including tol-
eration "even of opinions which [students] find abhorrent. 56 It
6o See TEXAS REPORT, supra note 46, at 13-15.
, Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 12. The full passage reads:
The primary difference is that the recommended policy refers to "acts or commu-
nications," whereas [section] 46 generically refers to "conduct." Since the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress always has included harms brought
about by "verbal conduct," the change in wording is in the nature of a clarification
and not a substantive revision.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Paul Brest, Bill Cohen, Tom Grey, Robert Rabin, Charles Lawrence and Gerald Gun-
ther all took part, and the opposing positions of Lawrence and Gunther were reprinted in
the Stanford Lawyer. See Good Speech, Bad- Speech-Should Universities Restrict Ex-
pression That Is Racist Or Otherwise Denigrating? Two Views . STANFORD LAW. 4, 7
(Spring 1990) [hereinafter Good Speech, Bad Speech].
"5 STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FREE EXPRESSION
AND DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT 1 (June 1990) [hereinafter STANFORD INTERPRETATION].
16 Id. para. 1.
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continues, that "Stanford is also committed to principles of equal
opportunity and non-discrimination" because of race and other
factors. Thus, "[h]arassment of students on the basis of any of
these characteristics contributes to a hostile environment that
makes access to education for those subjected to it less than equal.
Such discriminatory harassment is therefore considered to be a vi-
olation of the Fundamental Standard.
'57
The two remaining paragraphs of the Interpretation contain
the operative provisions:
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is intended
to clarify the point at which protected free expression ends and
prohibited discriminatory harassment begins. Prohibited harass-
ment includes discriminatory intimidation by threats of violence,
and also includes personal vilification of students on the basis of
their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or na-
tional and ethnic origin.
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by per-
sonal vilification if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small
number of individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handi-
cap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it
insults or stigmatizes; and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal
symbols.
In the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilifica-
tion, insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are
those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to in-
cite to an immediate breach of the peace," and which are com-
monly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or con-
tempt for human beings on the basis of their sex, race, color,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin.5 8
Appended to the Interpretation is a very thoughtful series of
comments in the form of questions and answers. It limits the ap-
plication of disciplinary action to face-to-face or similar insults in-
tentionally directed at a single person or a small group of individu-
5' Id. at para. 2.
58 Id. at paras. 3-4 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942));
see infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text (discussion of Chaplinsky's "fighting words"
doctrine). The University of Texas Ad Hoc Committee expressly disclaimed reliance on the
fighting words approach. TEXAs REPORT, supra note 46, at 17-20.
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als.5 Moreover, only those words and symbols that are
"understood across society as a whole" as insulting or offensive to
members of the groups covered in the Interpretation would be
sanctioned.
The kinds of expression covered are words (listed, not exhaus-
tively, and with apologies for the affront involved even in listing
them) such as "nigger," "kike," "faggot," and "cunt"; symbols
such as KKK regalia directed at African-American students, or
Nazi swastikas directed at Jewish students. By contrast, a symbol
like the Confederate flag, though experienced by many African-
Americans as a racist endorsement of slavery and segregation, is
still widely enough accepted as an appropriate symbol of regional
identity and pride that it would not in our view fall within the
"commonly understood" restriction. The direction of profanities
or obscenities as such at members of groups subject to discrimina-
tion is also not covered by the interpretation, nor is expression of
dislike, hatred, or contempt for these groups, in the absence of
the gutter epithets or their pictorial equivalents."
The sincerity of the attempt to keep the Interpretation within
narrow bounds is apparent. However, the distinction between the
Confederate flag and the swastika, while tenable, points up the
subjectivity involved in defining what words or symbols are "com-
monly understood" to be insulting to the groups covered by the
Interpretation.6
The Interpretation also makes clear that it concerns only
words and symbols and not ideas, however racist or hurtful:
Making the prohibition so narrow leaves some very hurtful forms
of discriminatory verbal abuse unprohibited. Substantively, this
restriction is meant to ensure that no idea as such is proscribed.
There is no view, however racist, sexist, homophobic, or blasphe-
mous it may be in content, which cannot be expressed, so long as
those who hold such views do not use the gutter epithets or their
equivalent. Procedurally, the point of the restriction is to give
clear notice of what the offense is, and to avoid politically charged
contests over the meaning of debatable words and symbols in the
" STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 2-3.
" Id. at 4.
" The Interpretive Guide issued by the University of Michigan to flesh out its Policy
reached the opposite conclusion and declared that it was harassment if "[y]ou display a
confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence hall." Doe v. University of Michi-
gan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see infra text accompanying note 113.
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context of disciplinary proceedings.6 2
C. The American Civil Liberties Union
The National ACLU recently adopted a policy statement de-
ploring racism and other biases on campus and calling for aggres-
sive educational methods to deter them. 3 The preamble to the
policy statement says that "some" have set up a dichotomy of ei-
ther restrictions on speech or acceptance of bias as unremediable,
but that "[t]he ACLU rejects both these alternatives and reaffirms
its traditional and unequivocal commitment both to free speech
and to equal opportunity. 6 4 The policy itself provides in part:
1. Freedom of thought and expression are indispensable to the
pursuit of knowledge and the dialogue and dispute that charac-
terize meaningful education. All members of the academic com-
munity have the right to hold and to express views that others
may find repugnant, offensive, or emotionally distressing. The
ACLU opposes all campus regulations which interfere with the
freedom of professors, students and administrators to teach,
learn, discuss and debate or to express ideas, opinions or feelings
in classroom, public or private discourse.
2. The ACLU has opposed and will continue to oppose and chal-
lenge disciplinary codes that reach beyond permissible boundaries
into the realm of protected speech, even when those codes are
directed at the problem of bias on campus.
3. This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from en-
acting disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment,
intimidation and invasion of privacy. The fact that words may be
used in connection with otherwise actionable conduct does not
immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation .... 5
The ACLU policy states that the constitutionality of disciplinary
codes has to be considered on an individual basis, but it does not
address the hard question of whether the first amendment permits
62 STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 4 (emphasis in original).
63 American Civil Liberties Union, Policy Statement on Free Speech and Bias on Col-
lege Campuses (October 13, 1990) [hereinafter ACLU Policy Statement].
64 Id. at 1.
65 Id. at 1-2 (footnotes omitted). The policy continued by warning against overbreadth
and noting that the ACLU had opposed several codes that it deemed overbroad. It also
called for universities to take affirmative steps to reduce the problem by education, commu-
nication, increases in minorities on campus, course offerings, orientation, and counseling and
"such other steps as are consistent with the goal of ensuring that all students have an equal
opportunity to do their best work and to participate fully in campus life." Id. at 3.
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any sanctions against speech. 8
The California affiliates of the ACLU, however, have adopted
a somewhat more explicit policy about harassment on college cam-
puses.6  The California ACLU Policy begins with a preamble reit-
erating the ACLU's commitment to "protecting freedom of speech
to guarantee the free exchange of ideas," including abhorrent ones
expressed offensively. It also sets forth a commitment to full par-
ticipation in the education process on a non-discriminatory basis,
and claims that harassment of minority students based upon their
minority status could functionally exclude them from such full
participation.
In light of the First Amendment considerations outlined above,
however, any attempt to punish such harassment must be care-
fully drawn so as to address the severe or pervasive nature of the
conduct as directly as possible, and to avoid infringement on the
First Amendment protected expression of even repugnant ideas.
In particular, campus policy should not bar the ability of profes-
sors to teach their philosophies or students to express their views
no matter how offensive, but must instead focus on speech or ex-
pression used as a weapon to harass specific victims on the basis
of their protected status.6 "
The California ACLU Policy itself provides that campus ad-
ministrators "are obligated to take all steps necessary within con-
stitutional bounds to minimize and eliminate a hostile educational
environment which impairs access of protected minorities to equal
educational opportunities."' 9 The policy refers to administrators
speaking out vigorously against hate speech, promoting equality,
mutual accommodation, and understanding among the minority
groups and the rest of the college community, by assuring diversity
among faculty, staff, students and administration, and eliminating
"6 The ACLU also devoted a plenary session at its biennial national meeting in June of
1989 to a debate over the issue between Professor Charles Lawrence of Stanford and Nadine
Strossen, one of the ACLU's General Counsel, and now its President. See AMERICAN CIVIL
LmERTIES UNION, BIENNIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 1989, at 9-19 [hereinafter ACLU CONF.
REP.]; see also Lawrence, supra note 25, at 438-39 (arguing that Constitution requires some
regulation of racist speech); Strossen, supra note 25 passim (responding to Professor Law-
rence's article).
11 There are three ACLU affiliates in California, the ACLU of Northern California,
Southern California, and San Diego. Each has adopted the same policy, with minor con-
forming changes. I have quoted from the Southern California version.
68 ACLU of California, Policy Concerning Harassment on College Campuses (1990)
[hereinafter California ACLU Policy] (copy on file with the St. John's Law Review).
69 Id.
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discrimination on campus. Thus far, the California Policy does not
differ much from the National Policy. However, the California Pol-
icy, without explicitly advocating the enforcement of restrictions
on speech, implicitly approves narrow limitations:
Campus administrators may not, however, enact campus codes of
conduct prohibiting discriminatory harassment of students,
faculty, administrators and staff on the basis of speech or expres-
sion unless at a minimum all of the following conditions are met:
1. The code of conduct reaches only speech or expression
that:
a) is specifically intended to and does harass an individual or
specific individuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion, sexual
orientation, national alienage; or ethnic origin, and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom
it harasses; and
c) creates a hostile and intimidating environment which the
speaker knows or reasonably should know will seriously and di-
rectly impede the educational opportunities of the individual or
individuals to whom it is directly addressed .... 70
Professor Mary Ellen Gale of Whittier College School of Law,
a participant in this Symposium, was a principal drafter of the,
California ACLU Policy. In a letter to the New York Times she
defended it, noting that, as of the date of her letter, it was nar-
rower than any university's "speech code." "Offensive speech-in
classroom debates, public discourse or private conversation-is
something students must endure or challenge with speech of their
own; harassment that threatens personal safety and educational
opportunity is not."71
Thus, a number of approaches attempt to remedy this admit-
tedly serious problem. However, there is no agreement on how a
particular policy squares with the first amendment.
70 Id. at para. 1. Paragraph 2 of the California Policy calls for due process in enforce-
ment of any code of conduct and promulgation of illustrations showing when the policy does
and does not apply.
71 N.Y. Times, July 28, 1990, at 20, col. 5. Professor Gale's letter was dated July 5,
though it was not published by the Times for another three weeks. Although the Stanford
Interpretation, supra note 55, is dated June, 1990, it was not available until somewhat later,
and it is not clear whether Professor Gale was including the Stanford approach in her state-
ment. The Stanford Interpretation seems very close to paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of the
California ACLU Policy, but it uses a "fighting words" standard where the ACLU requires
in paragraph 1(c) that the forbidden speech "create a hostile and intimidating
environment."
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III. THE OBVIOUS CRITICISMS
I appreciate the severity of the problem of racist and other
hurtful speech. I also accept the good faith of those who have pro-
posed restrictions on it. The administration at the University of
Michigan was sympathetic to the first amendment; Mark Yudof,
the Dean of the University of Texas Law School, who chaired his
university's regulation-writing committee, has a long record of ac-
tive support of constitutional rights; and Mary Ellen Gale, author
of the California ACLU Policy, is a member of the National Board
of the ACLU and a leader of the ACLU of Southern California.
Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams, whose
ideas I will discuss, all have a sincere and strong belief in the free-
doms of speech and press. The institutions and writers who have
supported restrictions on racist speech, for the most part, have
done so with reluctance, convinced that the great intrusion of ra-
cism causes unspeakable pain to its victims and destroys our aspi-
rations towards a society based on equality. To them, this combi-
nation requires us to act.
Pastor Martin Niem6ller saw, too late, that he had been mor-
ally required to speak out against the Nazis, and while the analogy
is not perfect, we do well to remember his words:
In Germany, they came for the Communists, and I didn't speak
up because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew, Then they came for
the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a
trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't
speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me ....
and by that time no one was left to speak up.72
Even accepting the individual and collective anguish caused
by racist speech, and accepting the effect of racist speech in undo-
ing our imperfect steps toward equality, 3 there are several obvious
criticisms that we cannot ignore, and that we dare not minimize.
72 Peter's Quotations 22-23 (L. J. Peter ed. 1977). Niemiller was referring to his failure
to speak, as a private citizen against acts of government, while we are dealing here with the
failure of government to act against speech by private citizens. I think, though, that the
spirit of Niemdller's statement summarizes one serious justification for intervention against
racist speech.
"I Particularly in the university setting, many other types of "hate speech" have been
proscribed besides racist speech. I will not ignore all of these other categories, but I will
concentrate on racist speech, because it puts forth most graphically the collision between
the ideals of free speech and equality.
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A. The Two Slippery Slopes
Slippery slopes, while difficult to limit, are always present in
law.74 The slippery slope argument is heard every time social
change is called for, whether the call is to limit maximum hours
worked by bakers, as occurred in 190571 or to set aside construction
contracts for minority businesses in 1989.76 But where the first
amendment is concerned, the slippery slope argument has great
force. Most of us understand that speech undeserving of protection
usually comes from an unpopular and unsympathetic source; in
fact, many times the person or institution asserting the first
amendment right is downright slimy. Yet we have seen, even in
America, that little exceptions grow larger. As Justice Brennan
once wrote, "the censor's business is to censor.""17
For instance, the foundation case on prior restraint involved
an anti-semitic scandal sheet,7 8 but the Nixon administration re-
lied on dictum in the case7 9 when it tried to enjoin the New York
Times and the Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Pa-
pers during the Vietnam War.80 The Supreme Court held, in 1951,
74 See generally Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1985) ("a
particular act, seemingly innocuous when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future host of
similar but increasingly pernicious events"); see also Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Ra-
cism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 472-75, 491-92 (1987) (protection of speech especially suscepti-
ble to slippery slopes).
71 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1905).
Not only the hours of employ~s but the hours of employers, could be regulated,
and doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as athletes and arti-
sans, could be forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of
exercise, lest the fighting strength of the State be impaired.
Id.
76 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as
the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing
claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvantaged group.
Id.
I Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).
7' See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). On the character of the paper involved
in Near, see id. at 703; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 n.6 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). See generally F. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG (1981) (chronicling
the history, background, court case and aftermath of Near).
7' Near actually reversed an injunction against publication of the tabloid, and is the
bedrock case on prior restraint. However, in the course of his great opinion, Chief Justice
Hughes said in dictum that "[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent
actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops." Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (footnote omitted).
80 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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that leaders of the American Communist Party were different from
ordinary political speakers because they sought to undermine our
constitutional democracy by force; thus, they could be sent to
prison.81 This not only received popular support, but was advo-
cated by many broad first amendment constructionalists.8 2 It
wasn't long, however, before small-time bureaucrats used this ar-
gument to fire a subway conductor who would not answer ques-
tions about his membership in a "subversive group"83 and to deny
bar admission to an applicant who refused to say whether he be-
longed to the Communist Party.84 These actions were upheld by
the Supreme Court. The Earl Warren Supreme Court! With a Su-
preme Court that is less sensitive to freedom of speech issues, we
must be even more wary of regulating any restriction on speech. In
the case of racist speech, I see not one, but at least two slippery
slopes.
1. The First Slippery Slope: Why Only Racism?
A common justification for restriction is that racism is simply
different from other forms of hateful speech. Mari Matsuda has
argued that:
Racist speech is best treated as a sui generis category, presenting
an idea so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to per-
petuation of violence and degradation of the very classes of
human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is prop-
erly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.8 5
She cited David Kretzmer who wrote:
My claim that speech is unique rests on two factors. The first is
the catastrophic historical experience with racism, an experience
which reached its most hideous manifestations in modern times.
The second is the universal formal condemnation of racism. Ra-
81 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
'2 See, e.g., S. HOOK, HERESY, YES-CONSPIRACY, No. 94-119 (1953) (discussion of Smith
Act, which makes it illegal to advocate or conspire to overthrow government by force). For a
contemporaneous criticism of Hook as being too tolerant, see W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE &
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209-17 (1957).
83 See Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 471, 478-79 (1958).
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 38 (1961). Justice Harlan's
opinions in both Konigsberg, see id. at 41-42, and Lerner, 357 U.S. at 478-79, were based on
the right of a public employer or licensor to candor, but underlying the opinions was the
assumption that the American Communist Party was different in kind from other political
organizations, a fact thought to justify the inquiry in the first place.
'5 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357.
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cism is not a political philosophy adopted by some and rejected
by others; it is a phenomenon castigated by peoples of divergent
political and general philosophies. It has become the one ideology
outlawed by international law.86
Richard Delgado, whose article, Words That Wound, 7 is an
important precursor of the current debate, never quite asserted a
uniqueness argument, but devoted the first half of his article to the
special, and catastrophic, nature of racism. 8 Professor Delgado
stated his thesis even more explicitly in a recent essay:
Few acts of clear-cut racism come into the field of vision of most
white people; when they do, they cause a deep impression. Minor-
ities, by contrast, live in a world dominated by race. We experi-
ence racial treatment every day of our lives. We are bathed in it.
A high percentage of our social interaction is tinged by it. And,
when we meet with others of color, we trade stories of racial treat-
ment and how our friends are dealing with it. Race is a recurring
reality of our lives.8 "
And Charles Lawrence, author of an influential study of un-
conscious racism in America,90 told the Biennial Conference of the
ACLU that the marketplace of ideas was tainted by race:
The idea of an American marketplace of ideas was founded with
the idea of racial inferiority of non-whites as cheap commodities.
... Ever since, racism has remained, arguably, the market's most
active item of trade. It's not just the prevalence and strength of
the idea of racism that makes the unregulated marketplace of
ideas an untenable place for those who seek full personhood for
all .... The problem.., is that the irrational and often uncon-
86 Kretzmer, supra note 74, at 458. At a later point in his article, Kretzmer wrote that
[r]acist speech is not merely speech which advocates abrogation of this recognition
[of "the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family"]: it is speech which in itself is an affront to the inherent dig-
nity of man. It is not clear why speech must be allowed in a democracy when it
clashes with this basic value.
Id. at 477 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)).
8 See Delgado, supra note 5, at 133.
88 See id. at 135-49. Delgado has a brief discussion of the first amendment near the end
of the paper, but that discussion is sketchy at best. I understand him to be about to publish
a new discussion, which likely will address the constitutional issues in greater depth.
88 Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the Fundamental
Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 407-08 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).
80 Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Ra-
cism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
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scious idea of racial inferiority of non-whites is a disease which
infects and disables the operation of the market. Racism makes
the words of blacks and other minorities less saleable.9 1
I accept the factual predicates asserted by these writers. Our
history and the testimony of the daily victims of racism make a
powerful case. The problem remains, however, that I have heard
and read similar arguments, made just as passionately, by others
who have called some other form of communication so odious and
harmful that its suppression was also justified-even within a
strongly protective view of free speech. Consider the arguments of
veterans' groups over flag-burning:
The American people revere and respect the flag. There are no
comparable laws or reservoirs of public feeling for other national
symbols... as there is for the Stars and Stripes. Consequently,
the flag can be considered sui generis.... By desecrating the flag,
by burning it in a public place, as well as by shouting "Fuck you,
America," the demonstrators were in effect cursing passersby and
destroying an object that most Americans hold dear and revere, a
symbol that in fact represents them individually and collectively.
A veteran who fought in combat to preserve the flag, a person
whose father or husband gave his life for that flag in service to
the country, or any patriotic citizen who loves his country and
cherishes the freedoms the flag stands for, would likely intervene
to protect the flag against destruction. To most people, an assault
on the flag constitutes an assault on them as well. The fact that
the crowd was restrained in this case does not deprive Texas of
authority to prohibit conduct likely to undermine that restraint.2
91 ACLU CONF. REP., supra note 66, at 12. For a much expanded version of the talk
under the title If He Hollers, Let Him Go, see Lawrence, supra note 25.
9'2 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of the Washing-
ton Legal Foundation, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., National Flag Foundation,
Amvets, Air Force Association, and the Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Peti-
tioner, at 11, 15, Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Similar arguments can be found
in the Brief for Petitioner at 10 ("it is fundamental that the flag of the United States is a
unique, important symbol of nationhood and unity") and in Justice Stevens' dissent in
Johnson:
The question is unique. In my judgment rules that apply to a host of other sym-
bols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately promoted emblems of po-
litical or commercial identity, are not necessarily controlling. Even if flag burning
could be considered just another species of symbolic speech under the logical ap-
plication of the rules that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the
First Amendment in other contexts, this case has an intangible dimension that
makes those rules inapplicable.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For a perceptive view of this "totemic" attitude toward the flag, see McBride, "Is Noth-
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Consider also Andrea Dworkin's argument against pornography:
Now, we have been told that we have an argument here about
speech, not about women being hurt. And yet the emblem of that
argument is a woman bound and gagged and we are supposed to
believe that is speech. Who is that speech for? We have women
being tortured and we are told that is somebody's speech. Whose
speech is it? It's the speech of a pimp, it is not the speech of a
woman.... Pornography is a civil rights issue for women because
pornography sexualizes inequality, because it turns women into
subhuman creatures.. . . We need civil rights legislation because
only those to whom it has happened know what has happened.
They are the people who are the experts. They have the knowl-
edge. They know what has happened, how it's happened; only
they can really articulate, from beginning to end, the reality of
pornography as a human rights injury.... We need civil rights
legislation because, as social policy, it says to a population of peo-
ple that they have human worth .... that this society recognizes
that they have human worth. 3
It is significant that while Mari Matsuda has built a great deal of
her argument for restrictions on racist speech on the narrowness of
her definition and on the uniqueness of the problem of racism,9 4
she also cited Dworkin and the feminist anti-pornography legisla-
tion in supporting her belief that violent pornography and anti-gay
and anti-lesbian hate speech also "require public restriction."95
Americans were appalled when the Ayatollah Khomeini put a
death sentence on Salman Rushdie for blaspheming the Prophet
Mohammed in The Satanic Verses. Of course, that couldn't hap-
pen here-not literally. But Martin Scorsese's film, The Last
ing Sacred?". Flag Desecration, The Constitution and the Establishment of Religion, 65 ST.
JOHN'S L. R.v. 297 (1991).
93 Dworkin, Pornography Is a Civil Rights Issue, 13 WoIAN OF POWER 48, 51 (Spring
1989) (testimony before Attorney General's Commission on Pornography).
See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2360.
Treating racist speech as sui generis and universally condemned on the basis
of its content and the harmful effect of its content is precisely the censorship that
civil libertarians fear. I would argue, however, that explicit content-based rejection
of narrowly defined racist speech is more protective of civil liberties than the com-
peting-interests tests or the likely-to-incite-violence tests that can spill over to
censor forms of political speech.
Id. (footnote omitted).
11 Id. at 2332. Professor Matsuda made this remark as an aside, stating that pornogra-
phy raised different issues and required separate analysis beyond the scope of her article,
but her remark shows how "unique" exceptions can grow, spawning other "unique"
exceptions.
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Temptation of Christ, similarly outraged Christians because it de-
picted Christ as imagining himself married to Mary Magdelene.
The movie's opponents called for its suppression on the ground
that even a serious literary work should not be protected by the
first amendment when it tarnishes the most basic beliefs of inno-
cent people.
Finally, consider the "War on Drugs." It has a laudable pur-
pose, at least with respect to children, yet it has already led to
intrusions on the guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures and self-incrimination, particularly when pregnant women
are involved."' In at least one case, a new mother was convicted of
delivery of an illegal substance to a minor, based on the transfer of
her drug tainted blood occurring between the moment of her
child's birth and the cutting of its umbilical cord.9 7
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,"5 the
United States Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, upheld the re-
quired testing of railroad personnel who had been involved in a
train accident. Because most people would prefer not to ride on a
train being operated by an engineer who is either drunk or stoned,
the decision was not widely contested. On the same day, however,
the Court relied on Skinner to uphold a broad testing policy for
many employees of the Customs Service in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab.99 Justice Antonin Scalia, who had
joined in Skinner, now vigorously dissented, suggesting that at
least for him, this was too far down the slippery slope: °10
I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the
impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making
16 See Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, ix CraM. JUST. ETHICS 1, 41-47
(Winter/Spring 1990) reprinted in, 20 ACTIViSTS' QUARTERLY 1, 6-7 (Houston Chapter,
ACLU, Summer 1990).
'7 See State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct., Seminole County, July 13,
1989), appeal pending, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.).
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
100 Id. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Today, in Skinner, we allow a less intrusive bodily search of railroad employees
involved in train accidents. I joined the Court's opinion there because the demon-
strated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and
the demonstrated connection between such use and grave harm, rendered the
search a reasonable means of protecting society. I decline to join the Court's opin-
ion in the present case because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is
demonstrated or even likely.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as
the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise un-
reasonable search." 1
The real problem is that everybody has "so worthy a cause. ' '102
2. The Second Slippery Slope: What Speech Is Racist?
I find it noteworthy that in the catalogue of on-campus racist
incidents quoted earlier, 10 3 the cataloguers included as a racist inci-
dent a fraternity party celebrating "White History Week." Assum-
ing, as is likely, that the party was a malevolent parody of Black
History Month, should this kind of bad taste be subject to official
sanction? 104 Even if we accept the idea that racist speech should be
curbed officially, how do we define what racist speech is
actionable?
A major problem with any restriction on speech is that it will
tend to be overbroad. As has often been noted, "the First Amend-
ment needs breathing space, "1 5 and laws using "means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms"1 08 are appropriately struck down. l07 In Doe v.
University of Michigan,0 8 it was overbreadth, not the basic idea of
punishing racist speech, that led Judge Avern Cohn to strike down
the University's regulations. The plaintiff, a graduate student in
,01 Id. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Id. It is worth remembering that the University of Michigan's Policy on Discrimina-
tion and Discriminatory Harassment forbade not only "[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical,
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sex-
ual orientation, creed, national origin [and] ancestry." It also protected "age, marital status,
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status." See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp.
852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
103 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
104 Apparently, it wasn't even considered possible that the fraternity boys might have
been seriously showing pride in the accomplishments of Caucasians or that this pride would
not be racist if sincere.
201 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973).
201 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
107 While the Court tried to curtail the overbreadth doctrine in Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
615, by requiring that the overbreadth be "substantial," it has continued to strike laws
down as overbroad. See, e.g., Secretary of State v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 970,
(1984) (Maryland statute that prohibited charitable organization from paying expenses in
excess of 25% of amount raised in any fundraising activity struck down as overbroad);
Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981) (zoning ordinance banning live entertainment
struck down as overboard); see also Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S.
Ct. 3028, 3038 (1989) (remanding for consideration of overbreadth issue).
108 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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psychology, had said that he wanted to discuss theories of "biopsy-
chology" that posited biologically-based differences between races
and sexes, which he feared might be deemed racist or sexist under
the regulations. The court found that the claim that the Michigan
Policy would chill speech gave him standing, and that the presence
of an official "Interpretive Guide" to the regulations gave credence
to his fears.109
The Guide, which was withdrawn by the university during the
pendency of the case, gave as an example of "sanctionable con-
duct" the following illustration: "A male student makes remarks in
class like 'Women just aren't as good in this field as men,' thus
creating a hostile learning atmosphere for female classmates." 1 0
Since this was just what the plaintiff wanted to discuss in class, the
court found that "there existed a realistic and credible threat that
Doe could be sanctioned were he to discuss certain biopsychologi-
cal theories.""'
Other examples in the Guide included inviting everyone on
the floor of a residence hall to a party except one person because
the party-givers think she might be a lesbian, and two men de-
manding that their roommate in the residence hall move out and
be tested for AIDS.1 2 In another section of the Guide, the reader
was warned that "You are a harasser when":
You exclude someone from a study group because that person is
of a different race, sex, or ethnic origin than you are.
You tell jokes about gay men and lesbians.
Your student organization sponsors entertainment that includes a
comedian who slurs Hispanics.
You display a confederate flag on the door of your room in the
residence hall.
You laugh at a joke about someone in your class who stutters.
You make obscene telephone calls or send racist notes or com-
puter messages.
You comment in a derogatory way about a particular person or
group's physical appearance or sexual orientation, or their cul-
tural origins, or religious beliefs.113
'09 Id. at 858-61.
110 Id. at 860.
... Id. at 859-60. Given the university's treatment of three actual incidents involving
classroom speech, Doe's fears seem to have been justified. See id. at 865-66.
112 Id. at 858.
213 Id.
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It is clear that the Interpretive Guide was a particularly inept
piece of work, put together by some well-meaning person who had
no idea what the first amendment was about. The University with-
drew the Guide a few months after it was issued because "the in-
formation in it was not accurate.' 1 14 This was too late to save the
regulations in Doe, but for our purposes the issue is not whether
Judge Cohn properly relied on the Guide. The point is that the
guide was issued in the first place. It was, after all, not a "Dear
Abby" column, but a set of rules that could lead to expulsion if
violated. Some of the illustrations perhaps could be the basis of
official action, but most should not. Whatever we may think of
people who laugh at racist jokes or who comment derogatorily on
people's physical appearance, surely we cannot convert all verbal
bad manners into hanging offenses.
The disapproval of ideas deemed "harassing" is even more dis-
quieting than the attempt to enforce the Guide-writer's personal
standard of decorum. Many ideas are hare-brained, many are hurt-
ful and dangerous, and many others may or may not be worth-
while. At times, an idea that causes no stir coming from one source
may sound offensive coming from another. For instance, sociology
incorporates a concept called the "victim system," which holds
that an exploitative history in combination with discrimination
and prejudice often leads a group's members to act in self-destruc-
tive ways.' 5 The concept is obviously relevant to minorities of
color, particularly blacks.'16 When asserted by a white speaker, it
could be taken as patronizing, just as its denial by a white speaker
114 Id.
"' See Pinderhughes, Afro-American Families and the Victim System, in ETHNICrrY
AND FAMmY THERAPY 109 (M. McGoldrick, J.K. Pearce & J. Giordano eds. 1982):
A victim system is a circular feedback process that... threatens self-esteem and
reinforces problematic responses in communities, families, and individuals. The
feedback works as follows: Barriers to opportunity and education limit the chance
for achievement, employment, and attainment of skills. This limitation can, in
turn, lead to poverty or stress in relationships .... Strains in family roles cause
problems in individual growth and development and limit the opportunity of fam-
ilies to meet their own needs or to organize to improve their communities. Com-
munities limited in resources (jobs, education, housing, etc.) are unable to support
families properly, and the community all too often becomes itself an active disor-
ganizing influence, a breeder of crime and other pathology, and a cause of even
more powerlessness ....
Id.
16 Id. "Throughout history victimizing has exerted a pervasive effect upon Afro-Ameri-
can families." Id.
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could be taken as "anti-black.""11 But if we do not allow this con-
cept to be aired and attacked, for acceptance, rejection or, most
likely, modification and adaptation, we stifle thought and serve
neither minorities nor the university nor, indeed, the nation as a
whole.1""
This; of course, is what John Stuart Mill taught us nearly 150
years ago. 1 ' It is no less true today when minorities complain
about theories they do not like than it was when the Spanish In-
quisition harassed Galileo over Copernican astronomy. Even a re-
sponse such as "It's 128 years since Lincoln freed the slaves and
it's time for blacks to pull up their own socks" states ideas that
may be a part of a discussion on race, deserving of first amend-
ment protection. Individual preference or distaste for a particular
idea, in and of itself, is no ground for suppressing an idea.120
Insults involve different problems. Calling someone a "fat
Jew" when he is both overweight and Jewish involves neither vul-
gar words nor untruths. In this second case we may agree that the
remarks are both in bad taste and intended to hurt; nonetheless,
when we base our prohibition on the presumed state of mind of the
speaker and the assumed reaction of the person spoken about, we
dangerously complicate and expand the restriction.
Even when we move away from the borderline cases and focus
on the words we all consider offensive (i.e., "nigger," "kike,"
"spic," and "wop") we run into problems. A significant complica-
tion is that slang words fall in and out of style, changing meaning
and connotation in lightning fashion. These rapid changes makes it
extremely difficult to declare some words poisonous. 121
217 For an attack on victim mentality by a black journalist, see S. CROUCH, Aunt Medea,
in NOTES OF A HANGING JUDGE 202-03 (1990); S. STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A
NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA passim (1990).
118 John Zipperer, then an editor of the Badger Herald, the University of Wisconsin's
student newspaper, charged that the University's ban on speech that "created a hostile envi-
ronment" because of race and other factors will likely cause instructors to avoid controver-
sial subjects. However, he gave no examples of this happening. See Zipperer, Tongue-Tied:
Restricting Speech on Campus, NEWSLINK 7 (Jan. 1990) (syndicated in Collegiate Times
column by the Collegiate Network).
:" J. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, ETC. 5-115 (1960).
'0 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). "[A] function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger."Id.
121 1 once asked my Dad to stop using "colored" and start saying "black." My mother
pointed out that when they were growing up, "colored" was considered the polite term, and
that it was a little harder for my parents to keep up with changing mores than it was for me.
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In this century alone, we have seen the preferred term go from
"black" 122 to "colored"' 123 to "negro' 1 24 to "Negro"' 125 to "Afro-
American"' 28  to "black"27 to "Black"' 2  back to "black ' " and
now to "African-American" and "person of color. '1 30 We remem-
ber, also, that Richard Pryor put out several record albums with
the word "nigger" in the title. While he has publicly abandoned
Justice Thurgood Marshall, whose activism and self-respect need no testimonial from me,
continued to use "Negro" long after most blacks viewed it as an insult.
122 See W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, in THREE NEGRO CLASSICS (1973 ed.).
Dr. Du Bois most often used the term "Negro," but he appears to have used "black" inter-
changeably with "Negro," as in this discussion of the "free Negroes of the North" before the
Civil War:
Thus, Forten and Purvis of Philadelphia, Shad of Wilmington, Du Bois of New
Haven, Barbadoes of Boston, and others, strove singly and together as men, they
said, not as slaves; as "people of color," not as "Negroes." The trend of the times,
however, refused them recognition save in individual and exceptional cases, con-
sidered them as one with all the despised blacks ....
Id. at 48.
12' As is still used in name of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, founded in 1909.
.2 In his 1973 introduction to The Souls of Black Folk, supra note 122, Herbert
Apotheker reprinted excerpts of reviews of the book when it was published in 1903. From
what I can gather from them, the terms "black," "Negro" and "colored" were all in polite
usage at the turn of the century. Those unsympathetic to blacks consistently did not capi-
talize "Negro," but there was no consistency on capitalization among those who clearly were
sympathetic.
28 See supra note 124. The capitalization of "Negro" was a major issue of dignity for
blacks during the first third or so of this century.
126 See, e.g., Pinderhughes, supra note 115, at 108:
[W]e will use the term Afro-American rather than Black for several reasons: It
refers to an identity that is cultural as well as racial. Other ethnic groups are
rightly identified by culture or nationality rather than by race. "White" or
"Black" is not a culture, as Irish American and Italian American are. In addition,
the term more clearly differentiates descendants of American slaves from descend-
ants of Africans in other parts of the world, such as the Caribbean and South
America.
Id.
127 As in "Don't call me a Negro, I'm black," a common remark in the early seventies.
12' The term was capitalized in the Ninth Edition of G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
691 (9th ed. 1975).
.29 Gunther went back to a lower case "b" in the Tenth Edition in 1980. As he is very
sensitive to language and usage, I can only believe that he felt that the capitalization of
"black" had not taken hold. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 706 (10th ed. 1980).
130 I do not mean this litany as ridicule. The campaign for use of the term "Negro" and
for its capitalization was an important dignitary development, and the substitution of
"black" for "Negro" seems to have put-a stake through the heart of the concept of the
cowardly and superstitious stock figure that is so common in movies of the thirties. "Negro
Power" and "Negro is beautiful" simply do not have the force of "Black Power" and "Black
is beautiful." Why, I leave to semanticists and social psychologists. Nonetheless, usage does
not always keep up with theory and social activism.
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the word, the term is often used by blacks about other blacks, and
I have heard whites say that they use the term to refer not to all
blacks but to lower-income blacks, much as whites and blacks refer
to "rednecks." Thus, can we put a complete ban even on the use of
the term "nigger"? i1'
The problem with reading any words out of the English lan-
guage, or at least out of the first amendment was explained by Jus-
132tice John Marshall Harlan, in Cohen v. California, one of the
greatest of the first amendment opinions. a3  Cohen involved a
young man who, at the height of the Vietnam War, walked around
a corridor of a courthouse in Los Angeles wearing a jacket with
"Fuck the Draft" written on it. He was convicted of disturbing the
peace and sentenced to thirty days in jail. The Supreme Court re-
versed his conviction, in part because "the principle contended for
by the State seems inherently boundless":
How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word?
Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point
where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among
us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stop-
ping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below.
For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is
I1 There is a San Francisco band called the Beat Nigs. However, according to an insert
to their debut album of the same name, as quoted in THE NEW TROUSER PRESS RECORD
GUIDE 39 (3d ed. 1989), "nig" is "a positive acronym ... [which] has taken on a universal
meaning in describing all oppressed people who have actively taken a stand against those
who perpetuate ethnic notions and discriminate on the basis of them." Id.
One is reminded of John Lennon's song "Woman Is the Nigger of the World," which he
certainly meant as support of feminism and oppressed people. Other examples of sympa-
thetic use of "nigger" by a non-black can be found in two of Lawrence Joseph's greatest
poems, Sand Nigger, in L. JOSEPH, CURRICULUM VITAE 27 (1988), and I Think About
Thigpen Again, in L. JOSEPH, SHOUTING AT No ONE 11 (1983). Mari Matsuda considered, as
one of her "hard cases," Mark Twain's use of "racist dialogue to portray a racist land." She
fully recognized that Mark Twain was anti-racist, but stated that:
The problem for some African-American parents is that their young children may
suffer harm from further exposure to racist language, particularly in a white ma-
jority setting.... The failure of school integration and the under-representation of
African Americans in positions of authority in the schools increases the danger
that Mark Twain's realism, in some schools, will cause the kind of harm Twain
himself would have abhorred. We need safe harbors before we begin rocking boats.
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2369. Professor Matsuda has told me that she would not ban
Mark Twain, but would ask teachers to think about context when they use his works (letter
on file with author).
:32 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
"33 As Gerald Gunther reminded us in his criticism of Stanford University's limitations
on racist speech. See Gunther, No, in Good Speech, Bad Speech, supra note 54, at 41.
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perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is never-
theless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. In-
deed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.1 3 4
Justice Harlan then gave an even more compelling reason:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative func-
tion: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, de-
tached explication, but otherwise inexpressable emotions as well.
In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech,
has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message .... Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without
also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.
Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of par-
ticular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of
unpopular views.13 5
That last sentence should give us pause. We want to ban the
word "nigger" because we would like a nation without the concept,
but to ban words and thoughts to achieve even the highest social
end is not consistent with our notion of freedom of speech.136 Also,
134 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
135 Id. at 26.
136 "Racial insults convey ideas of racial supremacy and inferiority. Objectionable and
discredited as these ideas may be, they are ideas nonetheless." Strossen, supra note 25, at
549. We may recall in this context, George Orwell's appendix to 1984 (1949), in which he
discussed The Principles of Newspeak. By progressively distorting and eliminating Oldspeak
words, the Oceania authorities had made it impossible to state the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, except as the Newspeak word "crimethink." G. ORWELL, 1984 256 (Signet ed. 1981);
see also G. ORWELL, Politics and the English Language, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT AND
OTHER ESSAYS passim (1950).
A related issue is that of so-called "politically correct" speech, the notion that various
words should be avoided because of their negative connotations to and about those outside
the mainstream. It is easy enough to both attack the "PC" concept, see Taking Offense,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990, at 48 (cover story on "Thought Police"), and to satirize it as
college newspaper cartoonist Jeff Shesol did when his character Politically Correct Man said
that nine-year "girls" should be call "pre-women." See id. at 53. But there is a lot of truth
to the argument that words that most of us think of as harmless can add to stereotyping
("girls", "Orientals", "deaf and dumb", "black-hearted villain") or cause pain to those de-
scribed. See notes 121 and 130, supra; see also the debate over the Dictionary of Caution-
ary Words and Phrases in the New York Times Book Review. Compare Goodman, Decreas-
ing Our Word Power: The New Newspeak, N.Y. Times (Book Review) Jan. 27, 1991, at 1,
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we should remember Justice Harlan's point regarding about the
emotive power of speech. A group that believes that universities
should be all-white is protected by the first amendment. Too many
people have been banned in the past because their beliefs were
considered anathema, whether it be the socialists who were denied
their seats in the New York Legislature in the 1920's because they
did not believe in capitalism, 137 or Julian Bond, who was denied his
seat in the Georgia Legislature in the 1960's because of his support
of draft resisters.138 Thus, if the supporters of an all-white univer-
sity put out a pamphlet in moderate tones, they surely cannot be
suppressed. But if they feel that they can make their point better
with banners that say "No Niggers At State U," our checkered his-
tory of dealing with unpopular opinion should caution us not to
suppress them even if we dislike either what they are saying or
how they say it.
But isn't this too precious? We all know that "nigger" is offen-
sive. Why is this not enough to bring the word outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment? Well, to many people, the word
"fuck" is just as offensive. In fact, according to The Brethren,
Chief Justice Burger tried to prevent counsel from using the word
in the oral argument of Cohen v. California3 and was beside him-
self with the thought that Justice Harlan might use the word in
open court when reading his decision from the bench. 40 Similarly,
many of the writers of color refuse to dignify racial epithets and
with id., The Multicultural Dictionary, N.Y. Times (Book Review), Mar. 3, 1991, at 30
(letters to the Editor). My objection is to those in power mandating or forbidding certain
words, not to private action to avoid them. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
137 L. CHAMBERLAIN, LOYALTY AND LEGISLATIVE AcTION 48-50 (1951)
138 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1966).
'39 Cohen was argued for appellant by the late Professor Melville W. Nimmer of UCLA.
Section 3.04 of Nimmer's Nimmer on Freedom of Speech (1984) is entitled "Emotive
Speech," and is based in part on his brief in Cohen. For a discussion of how Justice Harlan's
views on the case developed, see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 128-33
(1979).
140 See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 139, at 133.
"John, you're not going to use 'that word' in delivering the opinion, are you?"
Burger asked.
Harlan had been deeply amused at Burger's concern. He had no intention of
uttering the word aloud in open court, but he side-stepped the question. He en-
joyed "twitting" the Chief, as he called it.
"It would be the end of the Court if you use it, John," the Chief asserted.
The Chief sat in rigid and pained stoicism waiting for the offending word ....
Finally, [Harlan] finished without ever using it.
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instead put dashes in the place of vowels. As Mari Matsuda put it:
"This Article does not spell out racial slurs in a personal effort to
avoid harm to others, and to prevent desensitization to harmful
words. '"141 On the next page, she quoted someone who referred to
"you fucking J-ps.' 4 2 It is understandable that Professor Mat-
suda finds racial insults more distasteful than variants on the word
"fuck"; so do I. But many people, most likely including Warren
Burger, would have written out the quotation as "you fLcking
Japs." And in Los Angeles, before the Cohen v. California decision
was issued, using "fucking" in public would have gotten you thirty
days in jail, not using "Japs." Is it good enough just to reverse the
rules of what words are forbidden?14
3
B. The Worst Risk: Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy
As real as the slippery slope problems are, the biggest danger
is that a racist speech exception to the first amendment will pro-
vide an opening for those hostile to freedom of speech generally.
While there are few people who stand against freedom of speech,
there are plenty who prefer decorum and orthodoxy to what they
at least see as rudeness, incivility, immorality and disarray. Many
of these people, I fear, will enter into a mariage de convenance
with those who are against racist speech and will point to a racist
speech exception as a precedent when they seek a further
exemption.1 4 4
This unfortunate result has already occurred with the feminist
4 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2329 n.49.
12 Id. at 2330 n.55.
143 I have been told the true story of a Japanese-American man who was mystified and
hurt when some people started telling "JAP-jokes" in his presence. It was explained to him
afterwards that these referred to Jewish American Princesses, and that most of the people
telling the jokes that day were Jewish. Whether this made him any happier was not
recorded.
Not all conservatives fit this description. The Federalist Society's newsletter, called
with uncharacteristic humor "The Federalist Paper," carried a description of a debate over
racist speech at Stanford in which Tom Grey, who is white, supported some restrictions
while Alan Keyes, who is black, opposed them. It was clear from the account that the ap-
proved position of the Federalists was to oppose restrictions on racist speech:
Keyes challenged the idea of providing people with special protection... because
such categorization is a bad idea, not only because it is an insult to believe such
people cannot protect and defend themselves, but also because such protection
won't leave people prepared for the real world anyway. "Freedom is the ability to
defend yourself," he emphasized. He drew a standing ovation and left his mark at
Stanford.
THE FEDERALIST PAPER, 1990, at 1, 4.
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attack on pornography. I earlier quoted Andrea Dworkin's argu-
ments against first amendment protection for pornography. 14 5 I
have no doubt regarding the good faith of both Dworkin and Cath-
erine MacKinnon, her colleague in the feminist attack on pornog-
raphy,14 6 but their biggest converts have been Ed Meese's Pornog-
raphy Commission, 47  as well as Warren Burger, William
Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O'Connor. 148
I see the same kinds of alliances developing if a racist speech
exception to the first amendment is created. Our Senators and
Representatives somehow had the courage to vote against the pro-
posed constitutional amendment to ban flag-burning; I don't see
how they would be able to tell a man who lost a leg in Vietnam
that flag-burning is protected but calling a North Vietnamese a
"Gook" is not.
A related problem is that those who enforce the law can do a
lot of picking and choosing about how they execute it. The more
exceptions we create to the first amendment, the more we enable
selective enforcement.149 Julian Bond had a valid point in his com-
plaint to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") fol-
lowing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (the Seven Dirty Words
Case). 50 In Gerald Gunther's words:
It is no wonder that Julian Bond is outraged about the FCC's
doing nothing to stop an announcer on a radio station in the
," See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
146 They jointly wrote a prototype ordinance that was vetoed by the Mayor of Minneap-
olis, but passed in modified form in Indianapolis. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1097 n.1 (11th ed. 1985). The Indianapolis ordinance was held unconstitutional in American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1317 (S.D. Ind. 1984), afl'd, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
"I See 2 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY FINAL REPORT 1258-61
(Dep't Just. 1986). In Fred Schauer's words, "[t]he Commission, of which the editor of this
Supplement was a member, issued its Report on July 9, 1986, amid widespread comment,
most of it negative." G. GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 375 (1990 Supp.).
1"8 In Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1316, the feminist anti-pornography ordinance was de-
clared unconstitutional by District Judge Sarah Evans Barker, a Carter appointee. Id. at
1337. Judge Barker's decision was unanimously affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in an opin-
ion by Judge Frank Easterbrook, a Reagan appointee. See American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit's judgment was affirmed
summarily by the Supreme Court without opinion, but with then-Chief Justice Burger,
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor stating that they "would note prob-
able jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument." American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
475 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1986).
"I As between our epithet-tossing disabled veteran and a flag-burner, guess whom the
police will arrest.
... 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978).
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South who frequently uses the word "nigger." Bond argued that if
the FCC can stop people who use four-letter words that are offen-
sive, they surely ought to stop someone who uses a word that is
offensive to half the audience in the South.'51
Gunther was concerned as to whether Pacifica would open the
door to more censorship.'52 My worry concerns whether legitimate
claims of hypocrisy, like those made by Bond, will merely give the
FCC an excuse to permit more censorship of language on radio and
television. It appears that the FCC seeks to put further restrictions
on speech, mostly sexual expression. 153 I could easily see it embrac-
ing restrictions on racist speech to buttress its restrictions on "in-
decent" speech.
One thing that strikes me about the articles justifying restric-
tions on racist speech is that their writers often cite awful opin-
ions-opinions that they normally would oppose-as justifications
for the new exception. I have heard complaints that the plaintiff in
Doe v. University of Michigan lacked standing to complain about
the anti-harassment rules, but a rigid view of standing was the
Burger Court's most effective means of preventing people from
even raising their constitutional rights."'5 I have heard it argued
that private universities need not worry about the refinements of
the first amendment since the state action doctrine immunizes
them from the Constitution; but again, a rigid concept of state ac-
151 G. GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 1122 n.5. Professor Gunther continued:
It is not that I think that Julian Bond ought to have prevailed in his complaint.
What Bond's complaint illustrates to me is that once you open the door to punish-
ing a station broadcasting George Carlin's "filthy words," the next step may be
that you will permit Skokie to ban the swastika... and will support Bond's claim
to ban derogatory racial expletives.
Id.
1d 2 See id.
113 See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,386 (1987); 3 FCC Rec. 930 (1987); Hirrel, Will Dirty Words
Disappear from TV?, Tex. Law, Oct. 8, 1990, at 26, col. 1 (describing FCC's intention to
impose 24-hour ban on indecent but not obscene language). A challenge to the ban was
presented to the District of Columbia Circuit, in Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding FCC definition of "indecent broadcast ma-
terial," but striking down as unreasonable time restriction its limitation of such material to
hours between 12:00-6:00 a.m.).
15' See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 482
(1982) (taxpayer had no standing to challenge establishment clause); Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-46 (1976) (failure to establish case or controversy
in suit alleging revenue ruling encouraged hospitals to deny services to indigents); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (lacked standing to challenge zoning ordinance). Arguably,
the message of these cases is that if government hurts all citizens equally, no one may com-
plain to the courts.
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tion has been a very effective way to keep technically non-govern-
mental centers of power free of constitutional responsibilities. 155
To have standing and state action used to support restrictions on
racist speech directed at poor people and minorities may seem the
turnabout that is fair play, but to me it helps cement doctrines
that effectively have prevented those very people from obtaining
constitutional relief from the courts.'56
Substantively, the supporters of restrictions on racist speech
tend to rely on cases that have found speech unprotected, a strat-
egy that is in my mind extremely short-sighted. A case often-cited
is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.57
Chaplinsky involved a Jehovah's Witness who was distribut-
ing literature in a small town in New Hampshire, and who of-
fended the crowd by denouncing all religion as a "racket." The
crowd got restless and a policeman escorted Chaplinsky away.
Chaplinsky then argued with the City Marshall and called him a
"God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist.' ' 58 Chaplinsky
was convicted under a state law that forbade anyone to "address
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
155 See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (defendant's action not
attributable to state); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech does not extend to actions of private corporation); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (state regulated, privately-owned monopoly
not sufficiently connected to state to qualify as "state actor").
106 In Warth, 422 U.S. at 490, and Simon, 426 U.S. at 32, the standing rules worked to
the detriment of poor people and minorities, the very people that the racist speech excep-
tion to the first amendment is designed to benefit. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 167 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), and Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting), both
involved assertions of constitutional rights that would have benefitted indigents and minori-
ties if state action had been found. Writers who support some form of restriction on racist
speech have, in other contexts, recognized the significance of these procedural matters to
substantive rights of minorities. Richard Delgado wrote:
Aided by computerized analysis, attorneys have been vigorously pressing actions
on behalf of disadvantaged groups. Initially some of these claims were successful,
but recently successes have become rarer and rarer. Instead, what we have seen is
doctrinal retrenchment; as the factual predicate for inequality claims advanced,
legal doctrine retreated .... Changes were made in standing to sue, and limita-
tions were placed on state action and on the type of relief allowed .... Thus, our
response to Blacks' "You promised" has been, in effect, "No, we didn't."
Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute,
1989 Wis. L. REv. 579, 583-84 (footnotes omitted). And Patricia Williams criticized Stan-
ford's narrow view of who was injured by a racist incident (essentially a matter of standing).
See Williams, supra note 5, at 2132-37.
:67 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
558 Id. at 569.
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offensive or derisive name."'159 The New Hampshire court had in-
terpreted the statute to cover words that "men of common intelli-
gence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight." 160 The United States Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the conviction in an opinion by Justice Frank
Murphy, which included the following well-known and oft-quoted
paragraph:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
"Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution .. .
Initially, several points should be made. Murphy was a public
man of great courage and heart, 1 2 but with little legal craftsman-
ship, 63 and while stars of the Court like Harlan Fiske Stone, Hugo
Black, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and Robert Jackson
joined in his opinion, no one seemed to have given its broad dicta
much thought. Chaplinsky is a product of a time when the Court
was only beginning to develop a jurisprudence of freedom of
speech, and almost every one of its supposed exceptions has been
limited or abandoned by the modern Court. In addition, the spe-
cific holding concerning "fighting words" has never since been ap-
plied by the Court to uphold a conviction, though the Court has
169 Id.
160 Id. at 573.
261 Id. at 571-72 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)) (foot-
notes omitted).
102 When he was Governor of Michigan, Murphy refused to call out the National Guard
to eject the sit-down strikers in the Flint General Motors plant, an action that led to the
unionization of the automobile industry but ended his elective career. While on the Su-
preme Court, he dissented in the Japanese Evacuation Case, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 233-42 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). His dissent has been vindicated by
history, and his reputation can rest on it justifiably.
,63 A well-known law professor who knew Murphy from his days in the Justice Depart-
ment informally described him as "all heart and no brains."
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continued to cite it on this point.164
The dangers of silencing a speaker to avoid confrontation with
his audience was shown not long after Chaplinsky in Feiner v.
New York.165 There, the Court upheld the conviction of a college
student for disorderly conduct when he refused a police officer's
order to stop addressing a crowd. At least one member of the
crowd had threatened violence when Feiner made derogatory re-
marks about President Truman, the Mayor of Syracuse, and the
American Legion. While it is true that Chief Justice Vinson spoke
of incitement to riot rather than "fighting words," as both the con-
curring opinion of Justice Felix Frankfurter 166 and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Hugo Black1 67 make apparent, the only danger
of violence, if any, came from the crowd, stirred up against Feiner
by his own, highly political and unpopular, words. Feiner, nonethe-
less, went to jail.
Chaplinsky also held that the first amendment does not pro-
tect words "which by their very utterance inflict injury" and that
"are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality. 1 68 To be sure, this dictum could
support restrictions on racist speech, but it would also support the
prosecutions of homosexual art such as Robert Mapplethorpe's, as
well as art and music deemed anti-religious or otherwise offen-
sive.16 9 With Congress interfering with the National Endowment
"' G. GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 1048.
Although the Court has repudiated the notion of broad exceptions from First
Amendment concerns for most of the types of speech listed by Justice Murphy in
Chaplinsky, the specific holding of Chaplinsky with regard to the non-protected
nature of 'fighting words' continues to be cited by the modern Court, albeit in
diluted form.
Id.
More recently, however, Gunther emphasized the fact that the Court has never upheld
a "fighting words" conviction since Chaplinsky. See Gunther, No, in Good Speech, Bad
Speech, supra note 54, at 41. The University of Texas Ad Hoc Committee on Racial Harass-
ment refused to rely on Chaplinsky for the same reason. See TEXAS REPORT, supra note 46,
at 19. Other universities such as Stanford have relied heavily on Chaplinsky. For examples
of the non-application of Chaplinsky, see Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 901 (1972);
Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972); 415 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1974); Brown v.
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914, 914 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Cohen v.
California, .403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
:65 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
as Id. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1:6 Id. at 321 (Black, J., dissenting).
11 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
" See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (2
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for the Arts' funding of allegedly "offensive" art and prosecutors
seeking convictions against art museums, rap groups and record
sellers, now is not the time to provide censors with more weapons.
Finally, we should consider Beauharnais v. Illinois,170 which
upheld an Illinois group criminal libel law. Like Chaplinsky, Beau-
harnais placed libel outside the area of constitutionally protected
speech. 17 1 Since then, New York Times v. Sullivan17 2 has limited
libel significantly and made clear that it is protected speech,
though not necessarily immune from sanction. In the dispute over
the Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois, the Seventh Circuit suggested
that Beauharnais was, in fact, dead although never overruled ex-
pressly.17 3 The Supreme Court denied a stay from the Seventh Cir-
cuit order, and later denied certiorari. 17 4 Both Court orders were
per curiam over dissents by Justice Blackmun who called for con-
sideration of the lower court decision in light of Beauharnais. The
majority ignored Blackmun's argument. It is very dangerous to
read too much into certiorari and stay denials, but it certainly
seems that the majority in 1978 considered Beauharnais a dead
letter.17 5
However, the fact that there was doubt about Beauharnais in
1978 does not mean that it is dead in the 1990's.17e Beauharnais
Live Crew recording "As Nasty as They Wanna Be" declared obscene). There is a local
band in Houston named Jesus Penis, and among the names of groups reviewed in THE NEW
TROUSER PRESS RECORD GUIDE (3d ed. 1989) which would give great pain and anger to the
religious are Blind Idiot God, the Blessed Virgins, the Jesus and Mary Chain, Teenage Jesus
and the Jerks, and the Sisters of Mercy (an all-male band). Other names that would seri-
ously offend or hurt identifiable groups or individuals are Butthole Surfers, the Crucifucks,
the Dicks, the Fartz, Scraping Foetus Off the Wall, Pearl Harbour and the Explosions, Lit-
tle Bo Bitch (another all-male group, whose name was changed to Lonely Boys when they
came to America), the Sic F*cks, Siouxsie and the Banshees (whose debut consisted of a
"lengthy free-form rendition of 'The Lord's Prayer,' stopping only when they became
bored," id. at 522), the (very popular) Dead Kennnedys, and everybody's favorite, Sandy
Duncan's Eye. An offensiveness standard, even a limited one, would give prosecutors, who
tend not to like punk-new wave-heavy metal-rap bands to begin with, a great chance to
make trouble. I am indebted to Mr. Blake Brunkenhoefer of the Class of 1992 at the Univer-
sity of Houston Law Center for assistance with this footnote (and for the loan of his copy of
THE NEW TROUSER PRESS RECORD GUIDE, which I recommend highly).
170 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
171 Id. at 266.
172 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
73 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
171 Smith v. Colin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
175 See generally, Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227,
1277 (1979) (discussing how to treat majority's silence when dissent argues merits).
171 Marc Franklin, a leading writer on both torts and communications law, has in-
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itself involved an anti-black pamphlet, and it is certainly possible
that the post-Reagan majority on the Supreme Court could decide
that group libel is still "outside" the first amendment in a case
involving racial speech. In the long run, however, a resurrection of
Beauharnais will give prosecutors a weapon against those who
speak intemporately about religions, or against other groups that
offend people. I expect that these prosecutors may favor some
groups that most writers do not intend to protect.17 Even if a
prosecutor does protect "discrete and insular minorities," he may
protect them at the expense of other minorities, like rap groups
that are sexist, homophobic or, perhaps, anti-semitic.
One of the most perceptive comments about this facet of the
issue is an article by Chris Nealon, which appeared in a local
Houston gay publication. 17 The article pointed to conservative at-
tacks on homosexuals, but then focussed in on the homophobic
lyrics of rap music and other forms of popular art:
What about right-wing artistic expression, the production of cul-
ture designed to degrade us, even assault us? The examples are
easy enough to come up with, given the long history of
homophobic stand-up comedy-Andrew Dice Clay is only the
most recent example-and the proliferation of virulently anti-gay
rap music, from Big Daddy Kane ("The Big Daddy law is anti-
faggot") to Public Enemy. "Hate speech" as it is now called, has
become the obscenity in the war over artistic expression. And it
has put many lesbian and gay activists in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of advocating the removal of some cultural figures, Clay and
Andy Rooney among them, from the public eye, while simultane-
formed me that Beauharnais is often cited favorably by lower courts. In his opinion, it is far
from dead.
'77 An analogy illustrates the danger. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
harm is a standard, if somewhat vague, tort going back at least to the nineteenth century.
See W. KEETON, D. DOBBs, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 12 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. It is the basis of the racial harassment regulations adopted
at the University of Texas. See TEXAS REPORT, supra note 46, at 11-15. But it was this very
tort that Jerry Falwell tried to use to avoid the first amendment restrictions on libel when
he sued Larry Flynt and Hustler Magazine over a scurrilous, but obviously political parody.
Falwell was awarded $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. See Falwell v. Flynt,
797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court threw the judgment out, but left
open room for further mischief. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
Further discussion of this approach appears in Part V of this Article, infra and text accom-
panying notes 209-15.
18 Nealon, The Attack on Gay Sexuality, Montrose Activity Center Newsl., Sept. 1990,
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ously battling to keep gay-positive art alive. 179
Nealon suggested, as have other writers, that there is a differ-
ence between shutting down "hate speech" and opposing attempts
to ban art as obscene.
It is one thing to keep open the possibility of expression that
some people may find offensive, and quite another to try to block
speech that does immediate and widespread damage to an already
disenfranchised community.
Or is it? The issues get even murkier when an art form like
rap is used as a tool for gay-bashing. Black rappers, who produce
almost all rap music, are themselves part of a violently dis-
empowered community; and rap music plays an important role in
carving out a contemporary cultural identity for young black
men.
180
Nealon then pointed to what I think is one of the greatest
dangers that those who would suppress hate-speech may create:
So for lesbians and gay men who are angry about homophobia in
rap, for instance, it's hard to decide what to do. The obvious dan-
ger in starting a fight against speech of any kind, no matter how
reprehensible, is that we will help create a monster; that our spe-
cific attempts to eliminate homophobic speech will be sucked up
into a larger, right-wing drive to limit any expression that deals
with homosexuality.181
I would expand that warning even further. Attempts to control
people's language and ideas are not one-way ratchets. No matter
how much we try to bound the forbidden area and immunize other
speech, each time we silence somebody we give a new weapon to
others-police, prosecutors, senators, and college presidents-who
are likely to use that weapon against someone whose speech we
believe should be protected. We will not know what speech will be
restricted until it is too late; that we protest, "No, we didn't mean
that kind of speech," will get no heed. Pastor Niem6ller's remarks
will come back to haunt us in a very different way. 8 2
179 Id.
190 Id. The paragraph continued by discussing the testimony of Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
the literary theorist, that 2 Live Crew's outrageously sexist rap lyrics were actually mocking
negative stereotypes of black sexuality by the use of exaggeration. The paragraph concluded
"[i]n short, Gates was saying that context makes a difference, that what is offensive to one
community may be life-giving for another." Id.
101 Id.
1"2 See supra text accompanying note 72.
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IV. BUT...
Despite these essential criticisms, I keep coming back to what
I see as the quintessential picture-the young man from the black
ghetto who has listened to his family and teachers and worked
hard at school at the cost of being thought a nerd, who has avoided
the obstacles of drugs, crime and dropping out, who has gotten
into a good university and who arrives on campus to see a sign that
says "Nigger go home." It is easy for us to say that he has to de-
velop a tough hide, that we have "a profound national commit-
ment" to public debate that is "uninhibited, robust and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks . ...",18' However, it is cold comfort to
that young man, or to the American-born child of Vietnamese boat
people who has won a scholarship to Stanford, the black woman
who has driven up 1-94 from Detroit to Ann Arbor, the Chicana
who has left the colonias of the Rio Grande Valley to go to Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, or the Native American who is entering the
University of Wisconsin. It was pretty scary for most of us when
we first got to college, even if we looked like everybody else. But
students from minority groups often start out feeling like outsid-
ers; if we allow fraternities to hang pictures of Little Black Sambo
with diagonal lines through them 84 or to put up signs saying "no
nega babies,"'185 or to use any of the million variants adapted to
hurt whatever race, culture, sexual orientation, or other category
that someone does not like, how are these young people to re-
spond? A sizeable number of black students are leaving the big
state and private universities to attend historically black colleges.
They are doing so primarily to avoid hostile environments, voting
with their feet.8 6 Is it the minority's responsibility to bear the pain
so that the .majority may speak freely? If that is our only answer to
racist speech, what will remain of our commitment to equal oppor-
tunity in education?
Building on an important article by Alan Freeman, 87 Profes-
183 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. It should be noted that the Times Court was
speaking of debate "on public issues" and attacks "on government and public officials." Id.
See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2320 n.2.
188 See id. at 2333 n.71.
188 See id. at 2371 n.251.
See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978). It does
not minimize the contribution of Professor Matsuda and other writers of "outsider jurispru-
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sor Mari Matsuda brought home to many of us the importance of
remembering the terrible impact of racist speech on those toward
whom it is aimed.188 Her approach does, though, have risks: speech
is often hurtful and the victim's perspective often calls for suppres-
sion, regardless of whether we are talking about flag-burning, defa-
mation, pornography or profanity. The victim's perspective is a
very slippery slope,18 9 and we must not forget this. But I am com-
ing to think that we also cannot forget the victim's story.
Patricia Williams has written about "spirit-murder.""19 I think
this is what happens to those who are incessantly subjected to in-
sults and essentially are not thought of as people. I have never
been called a hateful name to my face, and if I were, I suppose that
I would either laugh it off or recover quickly. But we recognize that
to many people, particularly people of color, insults, whether direct
and intentional or oblique and unintentional, are part of daily
life.' 91
The attempt to split bias from violence has been this soci-
ety's most enduring and fatal rationalization. Prejudice does hurt,
however, just as the absence of prejudice can nourish and shelter.
Discrimination can repel and vilify, ostracize and alienate. White
people who do not believe this should try telling everyone they
meet that one of their ancestors was black.192
Charles Lawrence has argued that Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 93 was really about equal citizenship and the absence of caste
in America, and that racial insults block equal access to education,
dence" or "critical race theory," to recognize that Freeman wrote about what he called the
"victim perspective" over ten years ago. See id. at 1053 n.16. Like all intellectual concepts
(read "ideas"), this one has many parents, but Freeman was certainly one of the first in
contemporary legal scholarship. Professor Matsuda referred to Freeman's work in Matsuda,
supra note 1, at 2340 n.103.
18' See Matsuda, supra note 1. Needless to say, Professor Matsuda is not the only
writer who has shown the impact of racist words on their objects. Richard Delgado's Words
That Wound article accomplished that several years before Matsuda. See Delgado, supra
note 5; Riesman, supra note 12.
18 See supra notes 74-143 and accompanying text. Prosecutors are fond of citing "vic-
tims' rights" as an excuse for trammeling defendants' rights in criminal cases.
190 Williams, supra note 7, at 151-55.
"' For a moving account of well-intentioned hurt, see Monture, Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-
E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah, 2 CANADIAN J. WOMEN's L. 159 (1986). The author, Patricia A. Mon-
ture, is a Native Canadian, and the title "translates roughly into English as 'the way Flint
Women do.'" Id. at 159. The reader is urged to find this journal and read this article.
192 Williams, supra note 7, at 139-40.
103 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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thus undermining all that was accomplished in Brown.194 He has
also described the effect of anti-black, anti-Semitic graffiti at a
Quaker school on his sister, who is the principal, and on his neph-
ews, who attend it. 19 5 Both Professor Lawrence and Judge Damon
Keith have shown, impressively, Little Black Sambo's demeaning
effect on black children, and that such a hurt lasts into adult-
hood. 6 Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw has written that black law
students are likely to have different perspectives on law because
they "are likely to have encountered more racist treatment and at-
titudes than white students. 19 7 And Richard Delgado says that
whenever minority members get together, they end up discussing
the slights that they still receive, because "[r]ace is a recurring re-
ality of our lives." 1 8
Recognizing the immense impact that racist speech has on its
victims is not a justification for reading the first amendment out of
the Constitution, and we cannot set up the kind of moral thought
police that the University of Michigan Interpretive Guide envi-
sioned. Nonetheless, something must be done. The question is
what?
V. WHAT'S RIGHT AND WRONG WITH THE PROPOSED PLANS
The University of Michigan's plan 99 is a textbook example of
what should not be done. It is not even necessary to belabor the
Interpretive Guide 0 to see the overbreadth of the Michigan Policy
itself. The Policy penalized "[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical,
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race" or
any of eleven other factors, if it "[i]nvolve[d] an express or implied
threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment, participa-
tion in University sponsored extracurricular activities or personal
194 See Good Speech, Bad Speech, supra note 54, at 6.
195 ACLU CONF. REP., supra note 66, at 11-12.
See Sambo's Restaurants v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 696, 702 n.8 (6th Cir.
1981) (Keith, J., dissenting); Lawrence, supra note 90, at 317-18. But see Sambo's v. City
Council, 466 F. Supp. 177, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that Sambo's had right to attempt
business venture). Lawrence's two-page prologue is too long to reprint here, but everyone
ought to read it. It summons the emotional impact of racist words better than any single
thing I've read.
197 Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (1989).
,9 See Delgado, supra note 89, at 408; supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-41 and 108-14 and accompanying text.
.oo See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
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safety; or [had] the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of in-
terfering with" any of these categories of the individual's ef-
forts. '20 1 "Stigmatizes," "victimizes," "implied threat" and "rea-
sonably foreseeable effect of interfering" are all vague words and
phrases which are easily manipulated. The University applied the
Policy to matters well beyond insults and threats. The Policy ex-
empted public areas of the campus and publications such as the
University newspaper, 202 but the University charged students for
remarks made in classrooms, such as the belief that homosexuality
is a disease that can be cured or that the speaker "had heard that
minorities had a difficult time in the course and that he had heard
that they were not treated fairly. '20 3 Despite the attempts to limit
the Michigan Policy, even at its narrowest it permitted free-wheel-
ing disciplining of students for "bad" ideas and thoughts. Even
without the Interpretive Guide, it should have been struck down.
The other plans that we have examined are much more care-
fully designed, and are much more sensitive to the needs of free-
dom of speech. The University of Wisconsin's rules, for example,
expressly exempt generalized statements, even if derogatory and
racist.20 4 The Wisconsin attempt is well-crafted and narrow, but it
still leaves open to interpretation the meaning of "intentionally to
demean" or "intentionally create an intimidating, hostile or
demeaning environment." An illustration speaks of "demeaning re-
marks to an individual based on that person's ethnicity, such as
name calling, racial slurs, or 'jokes'. '20 5 Thus, a Polish joke would
be restricted, but only if it were intended to create a hostile envi-
ronment. Intent thus becomes a major factor, and it is to be "de-
termined by consideration of all relevant circumstances. '" 206 The
Wisconsin approach is close to acceptable, but it still leaves room
for after-the-fact inferences that could penalize a speaker for
210 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856; see supra text accompanying note 37. Again, we may pass
by the third limiting factor, which the university withdrew, namely, creating a hostile envi-
ronment. To my mind this was so subjective as to be intrinsically overbroad as well as
vague.
2 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856.
202 Id. at 865-66.
204 See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2)(c)(4) (1989); supra text accompanying note
45.
205 See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2)(c)(1) (1989); see supra note 44 and accompa-
nying text.
200 Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2)(b) (1989); see supra text accompanying note 43.
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lapses of good taste. °7
The University of Texas prohibits "racial harassment. ' 20 8 Its
attempts to use the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm
is the product of a thoughtful approach. It has four elements: "ex-
treme or outrageous acts or communications"; intention to harass,
intimidate or humiliate; a connection with race, color or national
origin; and a causation requirement of severe emotional distress. I
see, however, two weaknesses. First, although the policy is said to
apply to remarks addressed at a group of listeners and not to
"[a]bstract statements not addressed at particular listeners,' 20 9 by
its terms it is not so limited. Second, and much more important, it
suffers from the tort's usual difficulty of drawing a line that does
not make actionable ordinary insults that are part of day-to-day
life.
The leading cases traditionally applied the tort to cruel practi-
cal jokes, like the famous one in Wilkinson v. Downton.210 Though
the Texas Report has argued that its addition of "communica-
tions" to the Restatement Second of Torts' "extreme or outrageous
conduct" formula is not a substantive change,21' the case law and
commentary on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm
is unclear. The fifth edition of Prosser, written in 1984, quoted
Calvert Magruder's famous 1936 statement that "[a]gainst a large
part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments
incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughness
of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever
be. '212 However, the 1988 supplement to Prosser added these
words: "[b]ut this is a poor reason for denying recovery for any
genuine, serious mental injury. 213
In 1982, Richard Delgado found the traditional tort inade-
quate because of its failure to recognize the special viciousness of
racial insults:
What courts have thus far failed to recognize is that racial insults
are in no way comparable to statements such as, "You are a God
207 Apparently, the ACLU opposed the Wisconsin rules as overbroad. See ACLU Policy
Statement, supra note 63, at 1 n.2.
208 TEXAS REPORT, supra note 46, at 4; see supra text accompanying note 51.
208 TEXAS REPORT, supra note 46, at 20.
210 2 Q.B. 57 (1897). See generally PROSSER, supra note 177, at 54-63.
211 See supra note 52.
212 PROSSER, supra note 177, at 56 (quoting Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distur-
bance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936)).
211 PROSSER, supra note 177, at 17 (Supp. 1988).
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damned woman and a God damned liar," which the Restatement
gives as an example of a "mere insult." Racial insults are different
qualitatively because they conjure up the entire history of racial
discrimination in this country. . . . [T]hus far courts generally
have not recognized the gravity of racial insults within the rubric
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only an
independent tort for racial insults can fully take into account the
unique, powerfully evocative nature of racial insults and the in-
sidious harms they inflict.214
The Texas policy tries to use this approach in the university con-
text, limiting its application to "race, color or national origin,"
which is considerably narrower than the other regulations dis-
cussed. Perhaps it is narrow enough not to lend itself to overbroad
application; it may, though, prove to be largely unenforceable since
it requires both 'an intention to harass and the causation of severe
emotional distress. On the other hand, if these factors are taken for
granted, the Texas rules will penalize anyone who insults another
on racial or national origin grounds, and the careful work that
went into the Texas Report will be mere window dressing.
The Stanford Interpretation of its Fundamental Standard said
that it was "intended to clarify the point at which protected free
expression ends and prohibited discriminatory harassment be-
gins. ''215 On the one hand, the Stanford Interpretation is carefully
narrow in its attempt to limit its sway to personal rather than gen-
eralized insults,216 and in its requirement of intent to insult or stig-
matize, said to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.21 7 On the
other hand, it has a fairly long list of prohibited categories: sex,
race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and
ethnic origin. It does not include age, marital status or Vietnam-
era veteran status, like the Michigan Policy, but it is much broader
214 Delgado, supra note 5, at 157 (footnotes omitted). Those who would apply Delgado's
approach to sexist insults, see Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2331-32, would surely dispute the
Second Restatement's casual dismissal of the "God damned woman" remark as well. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
5 See STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 1, reprinted supra text accompa-
nying note 58.
2I See STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 3. In one of its comments, the
Interpretation says that its writers "believe that a racist or homophobic poster placed in the
common area of a student residence might be found to constitute personal vilification of the
African-American or gay students in that residence," but that such a finding would be con-
tent specific, based on the numbers involved and the perpetrators' actual knowledge and
intentions. Id.
217 Id. at 2.
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than the Texas rules. The specific list of categories is taken from
Stanford's anti-discrimination policy, and the comments to the In-
terpretation justify using this list rather than general harassment:
[I]n this society at this time, these characteristics tend to make
individuals the target of socially pervasive invidious discrimina-
tion. These characteristics thus tend to serve as the basis for cu-
mulative discrimination: repetitive stigma, insult and indignity
on the basis of a fundamental personal trait.... It is the cumula-
tive and socially pervasive discrimination, often linked to vio-
lence, that distinguishes the intolerable injury of wounded iden-
tity caused by discriminatory harassment from the tolerable, and
relatively randomly distributed, hurt of bruised feelings that re-
sults from single incidents of ordinary personally motivated
name-calling, a form of hurt that we do not believe the Funda-
mental Standard protects against.21
With the possible exception of handicap, I suppose that the cate-
gories all fit that description, but I'm sure that others can make
similar arguments for still more categories and the list certainly
goes beyond the basic category of race emphasized as unique by
Matsuda and Delgado.
The bigger question is the inclusion of the "fighting words"
concept in the Stanford Interpretation. 21 9 Like Kent Greenawalt in
his Edward J. Bloustein Lecture,220 the Stanford committee seems
to use fighting words less as a legal concept than as a metaphor. In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,22' the realistic potential for vio-
lence was the major justification for allowing the state to charge
the speaker with breach of the peace. The reasoning seemed to be
that by arresting the speaker, a brawl which he spawned could be
avoided. Yet both Greenawalt and the Stanford writers agree that
there is something wrong with a test-"likely to provoke the aver-
age person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace" 222 -that depends on the average listener's self-discipline,
temper, or cowardice. Thus, both use sort of a reasonable temper-
loser standard. It doesn't matter if the listener actually would
fight. Greenawalt suggests (for no apparent reason) that a study
228 Id.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 157-67 (discussion of "fighting words").
220 See Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L.
REv. 287, 294-98 (1990).
.2 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
222 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
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showing that twenty percent of the "average actual addressee[s]"
would fight should be enough to justify restriction of the speech.223
The Stanford Interpretation goes even further and says that the
phrase "fighting words," "while roughly capturing the sort of per-
sonally abusive language we mean to prohibit, may also have cer-
tain misleading connotations," (such as legitimating violence in the
form of a heckler's veto or not protecting the weak or self-disci-
plined),224 and thus should not be used too literally.225 At the same
time, the interpretation is not comfortable with an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress standard because "it is less well es-
tablished in free speech law than is the fighting words concept. 226
Ironically, the Texas Report, which uses the intentional infliction
standard, contains a similar discussion that dismisses the "fighting
words" standard as inappropriate to a modern first amendment
analysis.22 '
The California ACLU proposal uses a standard of specific in-
tent to harass and actual harassment on the basis of a fairly long
but relatively discrete list of traits.2 8 Even this standard, which is
quite narrow, depends on the meaning of "harass," "intent to har-
ass" and the speaker's reasonable knowledge that the "hostile and
intimidating environment" that his words created "will seriously
and directly impede the educational opportunities" of the listener.
I think I know what these words mean, but I worry what meaning
fact-finders (such as university bureaucrats or student-faculty
panels that can become politicized) will employ; I feel that they
may not be as cautious as I would be in finding a violation.
This, to my mind, is a real problem. Each of the four narrow
regulations that I have discussed, Wisconsin, Texas, Stanford and
the California ACLU proposals works fairly well, but can be
manipulated to suppress speech in ways that go beyond what its
authors intended. No matter how narrowly we define potentially
offensive words, we have to come up with some standard. We can
say that racist speech is bad, per se, but "racist" quickly becomes
223 Greenawalt, supra note 220, at 297 & n.27.
22' STANFORD INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 3.
225 Id. "Such a limitation might be appropriate under a breach of the peace statute,
whose sole purpose is to prevent violence, but does not make sense in an anti-discrimination
provision such as this one." Id.
226 Id. at 4.
227 See TEXAs REPORT, supra note 46, at 18-20.
22 See California ACLU Policy, supra note 68. "[R]ace, sex, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, national alienage, or ethnic origin." See supra text accompanying note 70.
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"racist/sexist/ethnic/anti-gay/anti-disabled" if not more. We can
speak of "outrageous acts or communications" like the Texas Re-
port, or "fighting words" like the Stanford Interpretation, or the
"creation of a hostile environment" like the California ACLU, but
each approach has drawbacks. If these concepts are kept in line, all
may be well. But the biggest problem is that restrictions on speech
often aren't kept in line.
VI. OKAY, WHITE LIBERAL, SO WHAT'S YOUR SOLUTION?
Once again, the Clarinet Concerto is playing (though this
time I am seated at the word processor). Now it's up to me. It's
easy to say what's wrong with everyone else's proposals. Can I
do any better?
I don't know. Maybe the problem is insoluble. Maybe our only
choice is either to make a small rent in the first amendment and
hope that it doesn't get bigger or leave the cure to the "more
speech" approach that will not actually stop the pain or the hate.
But I don't think that we have to give up quite so easily. I think
that there are a few things that government can do, occasionally
through the criminal laws or possibly the tort system; schools, col-
leges and universities have somewhat more flexibility, particularly
when they are also the "landlord" of a dormitory.
The best remedy, however, is organized private opposition to
hate speech of many kinds. Nothing in our right to freedom of
speech requires that speech be immune from criticism or boycott.
The real problem today is that good people are no longer speaking
up against racism and other forms of hurtful speech. Bouyed, I
think, by ten years of Reaganism, our children have been raised to
be rather casual about racist remarks. Unlike most of us, our chil-
dren have grown up on the front lines, in schools that are inte-
grated, whether by busing or affirmative action or just the drop-
ping of barriers. Often, this has been good, giving them a chance to
know people who are different from them. But it has also produced
considerable problems, especially when racial integration is cou-
pled with economic and class integration. Many white children
who use "nigger" have been called "honkey" or "whitey" when
they were outnumbered. Some of them have been beaten up or
robbed of their lunch money by non-whites. The reverse has been
even more true: minority children undoubtedly have suffered worse
abuse, both verbal and physical. We can say that both whites and
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minorities should be understanding, but it's not that easy. Not for
them.
Regardless of the social complications, the state has serious
obligations to minorities. There is no reason why the criminal laws
should not be used when racial taunts carry with them an implicit
threat of physical harm ("I've never had a Nigger" to a black wo-
man surrounded by a group of white men; "Jews can't fight";
"Spics don't belong in this neighborhood"). A jury after the fact
may infer a threat that really was not there or, conversely, may fail
to convict though the threat was real. I think that if juries are
more fully integrated, 229 the collective common sense-the main
reason for having juries-will prevail and a pretty healthy middle
ground will be found. In addition, the existence of the law will per-
mit police to act and thwart potentially serious racial trouble.2 30
Also, the possibility of being arrested, even if not convicted, may
deter white racists. There is a saying in the Houston ghettos that
"you can beat the rap, but you can't beat the ride." Maybe that
ought to apply to whites as well. Notwithstanding the dangers of
this approach, the requirement of an implicit threat is a sufficient
restraint, and there is no constitutional problem with criminalizing
speech that is literally assaultive.
Words that are nothing but insults, without an implicit threat
of violence, should not be governed by the criminal law. Although
the words may cause pain, the inherent boundlessness that I de-
scribed as the first and second slippery slopes23' stops me from
criminalizing mere insults. We should not use the criminal laws to
cleanse public discourse, whether of "fuck" or of "nigger." I greatly
fear that the laws, however well intentioned, will end up being
used against the wrong people. I also have doubts about Richard
Delgado's tort approach, at least when it is to be applied to iso-
lated instances of insults. In the case of more systematic verbal
attacks, Delgado and Matsuda have made out a case for a new tort
or for an extension of the existing tort of intentional infliction of
emotional harm. Systematic incivility, especially when people regu-
229 See e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (holding that pattern of pe-
remptory challenges to black jurors in criminal cases may establish prima facie case of dis-
crimination by prosecutor in violation of equal protection clause).
230 In hindsight, it seems clear that the police should have intervened to aid the blacks
in the Howard Beach incident when they were first called about "black troublemakers." See
Williams, supra note 7.
221 See supra notes 74-143 and accompanying text.
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larly have contact with one another, may justify tort relief, even if
the speaker does not really intend to cause emotional harm. But
this probably should apply as much to someone who regularly calls
another person a "fat slob" as to the speaker who limits his insults
to the accepted (though always expanding, it seems) categories of
disadvantaged statuses.
Most of the action has taken place in the university setting,
and it is there that most governmental and quasi-governmental 23 2
action should occur. In addition, school authorities at the lower
levels will have as much or more justification for intervention
against racist speech than those in higher education. 33 Recent Su-
preme Court decisions, however, have cut back on the student
rights that Tinker v. Des Moines School District23 4 upheld during
the Vietnam era.235 A racist angle would be a great excuse for the
Rehnquist Court to make further cutbacks. Nonetheless, university
restrictions can be justified, both in terms of equal educational op-
portunity, an argument emphasized by Charles Lawrence23 6 and in
terms of the collegiality that is so much the essence of college and
university life.237
Clearly, the university may protect its students from violence
and threats of violence, just as the government may do so by crimi-
232 By this I mean to include private colleges and universities that are not literally state
actors under current federal constitutional law, but which function much like a government.
See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 547-49, 423 A.2d 615, 621-22 (1980).
222 But see infra note 237 (university limitations on speech justified under doctrine of
"communitarianism"). On occasion, a residential university may be able to make a better
argument for action than a commuter high school, based on the communitarian ideas. See
infra note 237.
234 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2"5 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also Virgil v. School Bd., 677 F. Supp.
1547, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (upholding school board's removal of book containing works by
Chaucer and Aristophanes deemed "immoral" and "vulgar"), afl'd, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir.
1989). The Virgil decision would presumably be authority to censor Huckleberry Finn be-
cause of its frequent use of the word "nigger."
238 See Lawrence, Yes, in Good Speech, Bad Speech, supra note 54, at 8.
See Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682
(1988). This student piece makes an excellent case, based on "communitarianism" or "civic
republicanism," that can be applied to justify some limitations on speech by universities,
where a community that admits of disagreement and diversity of opinion is essential to the
enterprise. Id. However, it does not convince me that group libel laws should be upheld.
The communitarian approach and the traditional educational role of the university
combine to give it lots of room to require courses and other colloquia that foster greater
understanding and knowledge of other cultures. This was a major part of the National
ACLU's Policy Statement. See ACLU Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 4.
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nal laws. Thus, at the least, a university may make racist speech
with an implied threat a sanctionable violation. I see a stronger
case for punishing the plain insult-for requiring some degree of
civility-in the university setting than in the criminal law, primar-
ily because we are dealing with younger people who are required to
live and go to school near one another on a continuing basis. We
often speak of the university community, and notions of communi-
tarianism are more prominent on campus than in the streets of a
city or suburb.23 s Nonetheless, all my criticisms in the preceding
section of this paper apply to my approach as well. It is very hard,
perhaps impossible, to define just what kinds of unkind or uncivil
speech should be restricted, and it is essential that we let speech
go unrestricted unless we are convinced that we can keep even the
most justifiable restrictions within bounds.
Ideas especially must be protected, in and out of the class-
room, no matter how wrong or hurtful they are. Whether it is a
lecturer arguing genetic differences among the races; a course in
which affirmative action is criticized; a revisionist view of history
(favorable or unfavorable to minorities); or a student spouting off
in the Union about why the university should be all white, the first
amendment must protect that speaker. As Mari Matsuda has cor-
rectly pointed out,2 9 the university does not have to give a plat-
form to every point of view, flat-Earth, creationist, or white su-
premacist. But that is a far cry from enabling a university to
suppress those ideas if someone already has a podium or if the uni-
versity has a public forum, whether a "Hyde Park Corner" on the
campus or a campus publication open to all2 40 Thus, no matter
how racist a speaker's ideas may be, even to "neutral" observers,
the university has no business trying to suppress them, directly or
indirectly.
238 Many writers have drawn a parallel with proceedings under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), that find discrimination when an employee is
subject to racist or sexist verbal abuse on the job. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 73 (1986). While Meritor did not reach the first amendment issue, the workplace seems
very different from the university. The employer has almost total control over employees'
speech on the job and it is his failure to exercise that control over racist or sexist speech by
employees that violates Title VIL The university clearly does not have the control over
students' speech that an employer has over his workers' speech. I thank Bruce Griffiths of
the Houston ACLU for pointing out this distiction to me.
29 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2362-63.
24 But see id. at 2358 (hateful verbal attacks upon dominant group leaders by victims
permissible as part of marketplace of ideas).
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But the university has more power, to my mind, when residen-
tial housing is involved. As the landlord of a semi-captive audience
of students who must live together, the university can, and should,
enforce rules of civility. Thus, the much-publicized expulsion of
Douglas Hann from Brown University241 seems to me, on the re-
ported facts, to be justifiable. As I understand it, the student, cele-
brating his twenty-first birthday, got drunk, made a lot of noise
outside a dormitory late at night, and yelled anti-Semitic and anti-
homosexual epithets at a dorm resident. The dormitory student
told Hann to keep quiet, and later filed a complaint with the disci-
plinary council.242
Just as it may enforce noise limits or have rules about dress in
the corridors of coed dorms, 43 the university should be able to for-
bid racist signs or posters on doors and bulletin boards or in win-
dows. Restrictions on what a student may do in his room when it is
not visible or audible outside pose a different problem. Assuming
no unwilling roommates, a student's room should be treated more
like his castle244 than other parts of the dormitory.
A major source of campus racism seems to be fraternities, and
the university should have the same power to prevent various
forms of racist speech within the fraternity as within the remain-
der of the campus. Often, the fraternity will be on campus, and its
building may even be owned by the university. If so, it may be
treated much like a dormitory, even though its residents are to-
gether voluntarily. Even if the fraternity is off-campus, as long as
the fraternity recognized by the university and has some formal
presence in the university community, the university should con-
241 See Student at Brown Is Expelled Under a Rule Barring "Hate Speech," N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1991, at A17, col. 1.
24 See DePalma, Battling Bias, Campuses Face Free Speech Fight, N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 1991, at B9, col. 1. Brown, as a private university, is not directly subject to the first
amendment. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussion of constitutional implica-
tions of Stanford's speech code). The Brown incident has led Rep. Henry Hyde to introduce
a bill subjecting private universities to judicial review of discipline for racist speech. Con-
gressman Hyde, a well-known conservative, found himself in the unaccustomed position of
receiving praise from the President of the ACLU when Nadine Strossen joined him at the
press conference announcing the filing of the bill. See Bill Would Widen Assaults on Cam-
pus Speech Codes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1991, at B7, col. 1.
243 Cf. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3038
(1989) (upholding restrictions on Tupperware parties in dormitories on commercial speech
grounds).
244 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (under first amendment, mere
private possession of obscene materials cannot be crime).
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trol it. Many universities have imposed non-discrimination rules
on fraternities, most impose drinking, hazing, and pledging rules,
and at least in the past, most limited the times when women were
allowed in the fraternity house. In fact, the university has the
power to ban fraternities entirely. Given the impact that fraterni-
ties have on the social structure of many campuses, I think that
they properly can be held to a level of civility that would forbid
racist signs, slave auction parties, and the like.
The most important thing that schools and universities can do
is intervene before the trouble starts. They are in the business of
education, and educating whites about the majority of our heavily
non-white world is certainly consistent with that mission, whether
this is done by requiring courses in non-western cultures 245 or
through discussions among different groups. I think that these dis-
cusssions (to use the jargon of the sixties, "rap sessions") should
cover grievances of the "insiders" as well as those "outsiders". If
there is a predisposed end position, they will become political self-
correction sessions like those used by the Chinese Red Guard dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, and the white males forced to go to
them will tune out. If, however, the talks are well-moderated but
allowed to get acrimonious, if people are allowed to say politically
incorrect things246 both insiders and outsiders may learn about
each other, and in the long run, that may lead to fewer incidents of
both racist speech and racist conduct.
It will take great ability to keep meetings like these from get-
ting out of hand, but I think that talented and well-trained group
leaders will be able to make them work. I'm sure that this has al-
ready been tried at some schools. If we can learn from existing suc-
cesses and failures how to make these rap sessions effective, and if
schools intervene before as well as after incidents occur, we may
yet prove that Justice Brandeis was right when said that the cure
for bad speech is more speech not suppression. 47
That is about the limit of what I would allow.2 48 But that is
245 See supra note 237.
26 Like "why can't the blacks get ahead? My grandparents came over without any
money and. . . ." Or "I was the only white kid on the bus and the niggers called me 'white
boy' every day." Or the usual criticisms of Asians and Jews for succeeding academically.
2'7 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring ("the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies").
248 1 have mixed feelings about censorship of racist speech on university radio stations
or in university newspapers. Clearly the non-university government may not censor a news-
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not the end of the story of racist and other hateful speech. The
problem is real, on and off campus. That the Constitution forbids
government and its surrogates from doing much does not prevent
you and me, private citizens, from acting. Nothing in the first
amendment makes all speech equal in quality; rather, it simply
prevents government from making the judgments. Freedom of
speech, in fact, means very little if there is no criticism of what is
spoken and written. When the government or a university allows
racist speech to be uttered, it is not approving it or adopting it, 249
it is merely tolerating it; but when private citizens keep silent, they
do imply their approval, much like Pastor Niem6ller did with the
Nazis.250
What can citizens do? To begin with, the good people, the
ones who deplore racist and other hate speech, can speak out
against it and work at trying to bridge the gaps. Faculty and stu-
dents who oppose racist speech on campus can organize counter-
demonstrations. Kenneth Lasson, who has written in favor of
group libel laws,251 has written that "many campuses, though
largely integrated, are simmering with racial tension.'2 52 However,
in the same article, he noted:
paper's racism, and I have already expressed my doubts about the FCC trying to cleanse
radio or television of racist speech. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53. Nonetheless,
if the university is the licensee of a station run by students or actually owns the student
newspaper, there is a greater argument for its limitation of racist speech, since it owns and
is therefore responsible for the organ in which the racist speech appears. However, the risk
that this beginning of censorship will open the door to further censorship is reason enough
to keep the university out of it. Also, it is far from clear whether the university has the
power to censor a student newspaper. Compare Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo.,
410 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1973) (university newspaper articles cannot be "shut-off" due to dis-
approved content) with Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (ed-
ucators do not offend first amendment by exercising editorial control over school-sponsored
expressive activities); see also Joyner v. Whiting,. 477 F.2d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding
that president of historically black state university violated first amendment when he cut off
funds to student newspaper because of its editorial position that too many white students
were attending university).
24o Matsuda is wrong when she writes that a "doctrinal pillar supporting racist speech is
the refusal to recognize that tolerance and protection of hate group activities by the govern-
ment is a form of state action." Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2378. As the Stanford Interpreta-
tion states: "Free expression could not survive if institutions were held implicitly to endorse
every kind of speech that they did not prohibit." STANFORD INTERPRFTATION, supra note 55,
at.4.
:5 See supra text accompanying note 72.
251 See Lsson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt In,
23 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 77 (1984).
252 Lasson, Racism in Higher Education: Brown's Effect on Campus Bigotry, 7 HARv.
BLACKLRTTE J. 139, 145 (1990).
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[T]here may be truth to the notion that more speech, not less, is
the proper curative .... Consider these positive effects of the
integration engendered by Brown I: ... At Syracuse University,
students designated one week for celebrating racial and cultural
diversity. Groups on various other campuses have come together
in peaceful demonstrations of protest against activities viewed as
anti-Semitic, anti-white, or anti-American. At the University of
Maryland, students formed a Coalition for Understanding and
Tolerance to deal with matters of intolerance on college campuses
in the Baltimore-Washington area. 53
In addition, those opposing the bad speech can make more ag-
gressive counter-attacks. When I first started teaching, in the mid-
seventies, the most effective restraint on sexist speech in the class-
room was hissing by the women students. In a similar manner, fe-
male college students today can refuse to go out with fraternity
boys who run racist parties or hang racist and frequently sexist
signs from their house. We can all boycott sponsors of drive time
radio shows that feature racist jokes. Chris Nealon has called for
"guerilla art"-sexually explicit posters, street theatre and other
forms of confrontation-as a counter-attack on homophobia:
The advantage of guerrilla art is not only that it bypasses the
abstractions and the hype surrounding censorship, but also that it
is not confined to museums and galleries. Guerrilla art is about
confrontation, which makes it a useful tool in combatting hate
speech as well as censorship. A group of female artists at one New
England college recently took over a display case in the student
center, wearing bras and undies made out of pornography and
sexually explicit advertising. Conservative male students re-
sponded to the display with outraged accusations that public
space was no place for smut-implying that their bedrooms were
the right place.
This kind of direct action is valuable to gay and lesbian com-
munities because it is a positive response to our enemies-it's a
way of taking the offensive. Instead of scrambling to preserve
what little mainstream endorsement there is for lesbian and gay
art, instead of censoring hateful art, these actions produce more
art. They keep lesbian and gay voices alive in the public sphere
by putting them in unexpected places, by startling people. Guer-
rilla art cannot reach the same huge audiences the TV, music and
magazines can; it would seem easier to try to get Andy Rooney off
the air than to compete with his message. But direct action
25 Id. at 147 (footnotes omitted).
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groups like ACT UP have taught us that small, carefully targeted
protests, in unusual settings like administrative offices or
churches, have the powerful effect of keeping lesbians and gay
men on the offensive. They are a shock to the polite heterosexual
system, and the healthiest response so far to the war on our
sexuality.'
James 0. Freedman, President of Dartmouth College, recently
wrote, "[f]or the past ten years The Dartmouth Review-an off-
campus newspaper unassociated with Dartmouth College-has at-
tracted national attention with its brazen attacks on blacks,
women, homosexuals, Native Americans and Jews. ' 2 5 Though he
detailed some really obnoxious examples of adulation of the Nazis
and full-out, unabashed racism, President Freedman did not try to
find some way of suppressing the student editors of the paper. In-
stead, he called attention to the people who supported it with their
money and with post-graduation jobs. As he put it, "My quarrel is
not so much with the handful of undergraduates who write for The
Review as it is with those outsiders-including Patrick Buchanan,
William F. Buckley Jr., George Gilder and William Rusher-who
continue to support it."21 6 He reported that the John M. Olin
Foundation, headed by former Secretary of the Treasury William
E. Simon, had contributed $295,000 to the Review over the past
ten years. In all, conservative patrons had contributed more than
$800,000 to it in the past three years alone. "Those are heady sums
from respectable adults who ought to know better. '257
The more we call out the names of the respectable people who
are supporting racist speech, the more we boycott them and the
racist speakers, and the more we speak out against racist speech,
the more we will stop racist speech. And we, the people, should do
it with as little as possible of the heavy hand of government. Boy-
cotts can be abused, as we all know, but they are a legitimate an-
swer to bad speech, and a much better and less dangerous answer
than opening the door to censorship by government. That is a lib-
eral's answer, and I'll stand by it.
2 Nealon, supra note 178, at 5.
'55 Freedman, Bigoted Students, Doting Adults, N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1990, at A25,
col. 2.
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